Land Use Regulation (4th ed.) by Sterk

Jury Nullification - State v. Ragland
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1986
Court: Supreme Court of New Jersey
2. Disposition: Reverse and order a new trial on other grounds.
3. Holding: Efforts to protect and expand jury nullification are inconsistent with the real values of our system of criminal justice.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: The judge instructed the jury that, if the jury found that the defendant was in possession of a weapon during the commission of the robbery, the jury must find him guilty.
6. Facts: Ragland was prosecuted for armed robbery and possession of a weapon by a convicted felon.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: Ragland argues that the judge’s use of the word must conflicted with the jury’s nullification power.
Negative retributivism:

The requirement of previously defined conduct - Commonwealth v. Mochan
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1955
Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
2. Disposition: Affirm the judgment.
3. Holding: The factual charges identify the offense as a common law misdemeanor and the testimony established the guilt of the defendant.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History:
6. Facts: Mochan was charged with intending to debauch and corrupt, devising and intending to harass, embarrass, and vilify Zivkovich by telephone.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: Dissent states that legislature should define it as a crime.
Dissent: Ex post facto, legislating from the bench.

The requirement of previously defined conduct - Keeler v. Superior Court
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1970
Court: Supreme Court of CA
2. Disposition:
3. Holding: Judicial enlargement of section 187 was not foreseeable to Keeler.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History:
6. Facts: Teresa and Keeler divorced. Teresa was pregnant by Vogt but concealed the fact from Keeler. Keeler was driving on a narrow mountain road. Teresa met Keeler who blocked the road. Keeler talked, assisted Teresa out of the car, and found out that Teresa was pregnant. Keeler struck Teresa’s abdomen and face. Teresa received medical assistance where the baby was found stillborn. Keeler was charged with murder, infliction of injury, and assault.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: CA Penal Code- murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, with malice aforethought.
Dissent-there is no sound reason for denying the viable fetus the same status.

In re Banks
The statute is too vague and should be thrown out.

Statutory Interpretation - Muscarello v. U.S.
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1978
Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina
2. Disposition:
3. Holding: Carrying applies to being in a vehicle.
4. Issue: Is the phrase carries a firearm limited to the carrying of forearms on the person?
5. Procedural History:
6. Facts:
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: Includes car in one-thirds of the times. Dissent- Carrying in a car is not implied as a meaning in two-thirds of the time. Doubt in favor of defendant.
Majority: dictionaries, computer databases/newspapers, legislative intent, compare to ‘transport’, compare to ‘use’
Dissent: man min is harsh, newspapers use carries lots of ways, lenity

Voluntary act - Martin v. State
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1944
Court: Alabama Court of Appeals
2. Disposition: Reverse and render.
3. Holding:
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: For State.
6. Facts: Martin was arrested at his home and taken onto the highway where he manifested a drunken condition by using loud and profane language. He was convicted of being drunk in public.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: Martin was involuntarily and forcibly carried to that place by the arresting officer.

Voluntary act - State v. Utter
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1971
Court: Court of Appeals of Washington
2. Disposition:
3. Holding: The evidence presented was insufficient to present the issue of Utter’s unconscious or automatistic state at the time. The jury could only speculate on the existence of the triggering stimulus.
4. Issue: Was it error for the trial court to instruct the jury to disregard the evidence on conditioned response?
5. Procedural History: The trial court ruled that conditioned response, or an automatic response to a certain stimulus, was not a defense in Washington.
6. Facts: Utter was a combat infantryman and honorably discharged. Utter and his son were living together. The son entered the apartment and was seen stumbling in the hallway and collapsing, having been stabbed in the chest. He stated that “dad stabbed me” and died. Utter was charged with second degree murder and found guilty of manslaughter.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: One is objective, the actus reus; the other subjective, the mens rea.
The phrase voluntary act means no more than the mere word act. An act must be a willed movement or the omission of a possible and legally-required performance. This is essential to the actus reus.
The question is not one of mental incapacity. Criminal responsibility must be judged at the level of the conscious.


Negative acts – People v. Beardsley
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1907
Court: Supreme Court of Michigan
2. Disposition: The conviction is set aside and Beardsley is discharged.
3. Holding:
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: The trial court convicted Beardsley of manslaughter.
6. Facts: Beardsley was a married man who arranged to meet with an acquaintance, Blanche Burns, at his apartment while his wife was away. Beardsley and Burns had known each other for a while and had spent the night together on two prior occasions. Burns arrived at his home on Saturday, March 18, 1905, and they began drinking. Burns stayed there continuously until the following Monday. Unknown to Beardsley, Burns asked a coworker of Beardsley’s to purchase morphine tablets for her. Beardsley later saw her consume a few tablets and attempted to knock them out of her hand. Burns went unconscious and Beardsley could not revive her. Beardsley took her to a neighbor and asked him to look after Burns until she awoke. That night, the neighbor became concerned about Burns’ condition and called the authorities. After an examination, Burns was proclaimed dead. At trial, the prosecutor argued that Beardsley had a duty to care for Burns, that his failure to do so led to Burns’ death, and that he was therefore culpable.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning:

Barber v. Superior Court
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1983
Court: California Court of Appeals
2. Disposition:
3. Holding: Barber’s omission to continue treatment under the circumstances was not an unlawful failure to perform a legal duty.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History:
6. Facts: Following a surgical procedure, Clarence Herbert suffered a cardio-respiratory arrest while in the recovery room. A team of physicians, including Barber (defendant), were able to revive Herbert and place him on life support. Over the following three days, it was determined that Herbert suffered permanent brain damage, leaving him in a permanent vegetative, coma-like state. Herbert’s physicians informed his family that Herbert’s chances for recovery were very poor. Herbert’s family drafted a written request to hospital personnel requesting that all life-support equipment be removed. Barber and another physician complied with the family’s request and removed the respirator and other life-sustaining equipment. Herbert continued to breathe on his own, but showed no other signs of improvement. After two more days had elapsed, the physicians consulted Herbert’s family and subsequently removed the intravenous tubes providing Herbert with hydration and nutrition. Herbert later died.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: the cessation of life support is not an affirmative act but rather a withdrawal or omission of further treatment.
-Oregon Death with Dignity Act: different from Barber

Regina v. Cunningham
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1957
Court: Court of Criminal Appeal
2. Disposition: Allow the appeal and quash the conviction.
3. Holding: (1) and (2) (slide)
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: Trial court goes with the government’s view that he was wicked.
6. Facts: Cunningham ripped off the gas meter in the cellar of an unoccupied home and stole the money inside. Cunningham did not turn off the gas, which seeped into an adjacent house where an elderly woman named Sarah Wade was sleeping. Wade was partially asphyxiated.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: It is incorrect to say that the word malicious merely means wicked.
-what does mean “maliciously” mean?

People v. Conley
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1989
Court: Illinois Appellate Court
2. Disposition: Evidence is sufficient to support a finding of intent to cause permanent disability beyond a reasonable doubt.
3. Holding:
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History:
6. Facts: Conley was charged with aggravated battery after attacking Sean O’Connell outside a party. Conley demanded that O’Connell’s friend Marty Carroll give him a can of beer. When Carroll refused, Conley attempted to hit Carroll with a wine bottle. Carroll ducked and Conley instead hit O’Connell. As a result, O’Connell sustained a broken upper and lower jaw and four broken bones. He lost one tooth and underwent surgery on ten other damaged teeth. His damaged teeth are expected to last only two-thirds the lifetime of an undamaged tooth. Other permanent injuries include partial numbness in one lip. The relevant statute defines permanent disability or disfigurement as aggravated battery. It requires a person to intentionally or knowingly cause such injuries.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: -if elements of battery are met, can we go to aggravated battery?
-battery is a lesser included offense.

Knowledge of attendant circumstances - State v. Nations
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1984
Court: Missouri Court of Appeals
2. Disposition: Reverse the judgment.
3. Holding: Having failed to prove defendant knew the child’s age, the state failed to make a submissible case.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History:
6. Facts: Nations owned and operated the Main Street Disco where police officers founds a scantily clad sixteen year old girl dancing. Nations was convicted and fined.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: Nations argues that the state failed to show that she knew the child was under seventeen and failed to show she had the requisite intent to endanger the welfare of a child.
Code defines knowingly as an actual knowledge- aware that those circumstances exist and excludes those cases in whch the fact would have been known had not the person wilfully shut his eyes in order to avoid knowing.

Problems in statutory interpretation – State v. Miles
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 2017
Court: Court of Appeals of South Caroliina
2. Disposition: Affirm.
3. Holding: The trial judge’s instructions on conscious wrongdoing conveyed pertinent legal standards.
4. Issue: The supplemental charge misinformed the jury that
5. Procedural History: The trial court charged that the State bore the burden of proving the amount of oxycodone was more than four grams. The jury returned a guilty verdict.
6. Facts: While scanning parcels for illegal drugs at the FedEx, agents became suspicious of a package. The agents arranged for a controlled delivery and apprehended and handcuffed Miles at the delivery. Miles claimed that he did not know what was inside and did not know what kind of drugs were inside. Miles was indicted for trafficking in illegal drugs.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: Miles argues that the trial court erred by instructing the jury that the State did not have to prove Miles knew the drugs were oxycodone.
Miles contends the term ‘knowingly’ applies to each element of the trafficking offense, including the specific type of drugs listed in e3. -> court: Legislature did not intend to require the State to prove a defendant knew the specific type of illegal drug he was trafficking.

Strict liability offenses - Morissette v. U.S.
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1952
Court: Supreme Court of the US
2. Disposition: Reverse.
3. Holding: No grounds for inferring affirmative instruction from Congress to eliminate intent from any offense with which Morissette was charged.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History:
6. Facts: Morissette entered an Air Force bombing range and took several spent bomb casings that had been lying around for years exposed to the weather and rusting. Morissette subsequently flattened the casings out and sold them for an $84 profit. Morissette was indicted for violating 18 U.S.C. § 641 which made it a crime to “knowing convert” government property.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: Government- the federal statute did not expressly contain mens rea element.
-(1) (2) creature of statute

Strict liability offenses - Staples v. U.S.
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1994
Court: Supreme Court of the US
2. Disposition: Reverse and remand.
3. Holding: If Congress had intended to make outlaws of gun owners who were wholly ignorant of the offending characteristics of their weapons, it would have spoken more clearly to that effect.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: The district court rejected Staples’ proposed instruction and convicted him. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
6. Facts: Staples possessed a semi-automatic rifle that originally had a metal piece preventing it from firing automatically. Staples filed down the metal piece. As a result, the rifle met the statutory definition of a firearm under the National Firearms Act, 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d). Staples did not register the weapon as required by the act. The United States (plaintiff) charged Staples under the act, which makes possession of an unregistered firearm punishable by up to ten years in prison. Staples claimed he did not know the rifle could be fired automatically.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: -what mens rea, if any, needs to be proved with firearm as terms of art?
Government: the case fits in with public welfare or regulatory offenses (strict criminal liability; do not require the defendant to know the facts that make his conduct illegal).
Absent a clear statement from Congress that mens rea is not required, we should not apply the public welfare offense rationale to interpret any statute defining a felon offense.
Dissent: statute provides explicit guidance. The offense is a creature of statute. Is public welfare offense.

Mistake of Fact - People v. Navarro
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1979
Court: LA County Superior Court
2. Disposition: Reverse the judgment.
3. Holding: Navarro is entitled to an acquittal since the specific intent required to be proved as an element of the offense had not been established.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: The court refused two jury instructions by defendant but instructed two modified instructions.
6. Facts: Navarro was charged with stealing four wooden beams from a construction site and believed either that (1) the beams had been abandoned as worthless and the owner had no objection to his taking them or (2) they had substantial value had not been abandoned and he had no right to take them.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: LaFave- an honest mistake of fact or law is a defense when it negates a required mental element of the crime.
-Navarro’s proposed instructions were that good faith belief is enough even if mistaken.
-Did he have the specific intent to steal?

Mistake of Law - People v. Marrero
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1987
Court: Court of Appeals of New York
2. Disposition: Affirm the Appellate Court’s judgment.
3. Holding: The defense should not be recognized, except where specific intent is an element of the offense or where the misrelied-upon law has later been properly adjudicated as wrong.
4. Issue: Can defendant’s personal misreading or misunderstanding of a statute excuse criminal conduct in the circumstances of the case?
5. Procedural History: The trial court granted Marrero’s motion to dismiss the indictment. The appellate court reversed, stating that the statute language exempts only state guards.
6. Facts: Marrero was arrested in a New York social club in possession of an unlicensed loaded .38 caliber automatic pistol.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: According to Marrero, NYPenal Law 265.20(a)(1) exempts peace officers from criminal liability under the firearm possession statute.
Marrero argues that he was a peace officer by virtue of the statutory language, “any penal correctional institution.”
Marrero argues that his mistaken belief that his conduct was legal was founded upon an official statement of the law contained in the statute itself.
Prosecution argues that one cannot claim the protection of mistake of law simply by misconstruing the meaning of a statute but must instead establish that the statute relied on actually permitted the conduct in question and was only later found to be erroneous.
Court: the underlying statute never in fact authorized the defendant’s conduct.
Dissent: because the man is law-abiding and would not have acted but for his mistaken assumption as to the law, there is no need for punishment to deter him from further unlawful conduct. NY rejected MPC and follows its own Penal Law.
-Marrero’s personal misunderstanding of the law

Velazquez v. State
But for test for causation-in-fact fails and has been abandoned in favor of the substantial factor test: the defendant’s conduct is a cause-in-fact of a prohibited result if the subject conduct was a substantial factor.

Actual Cause - Oxendine v. State
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1987
Court: Supreme Court of Delaware
2. Disposition: Reverse the conviction of manslaughter and remand for resentence of assault in the second degree.
3. Holding: There must be proof as to who inflicted the injuries that resulted in death. Reprehensible and repulsive as the conduct is, it is not proof of manslaughter. Medical testimony was sufficient that Oxendine was guilty of the lesser included offense of assault.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: Trial Court convicted Oxendine of manslaughter.
6. Facts: Oxendine lived with his girlfriend, Tyree, and six-year-old son. On January 18, 1984, Tyree pushed Jeffrey into the bathtub, causing microscopic tears in his intestines leading to peritonitis. The next morning, Oxendine screamed at and beat Jeffrey while Jeffrey asked to stop. Jeffrey’s abdomen became swollen. Tyree told Oxendine of Jeffrey’s condition and urged him to take Jeffery to the hospital. Oxendine went out, bought a newspaper, and returned home to read it. En route to hospital, Jeffrey stopped breathing and was pronounced dead after arrival at hospital.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: Dr. Inguito and Hameli testified that the death was caused by intra-abdominal hemorrhage and acute peritonitis from blunt force trauma to the front of the abdomen. They identified two distinct injuries, one after and one before the twenty-four hours before death. Inguito could not tell which of the hemorrhages caused the death. Hofman identified only one injury 12 hours before death.
For Oxendine to be convicted of manslaughter, the State was required to show for purposes of causation that Oxendine’s conduct hastened or accelerated the child’s death.

But for test is imprecise for determining causal accountability for harm because it fails to exclude remote candidates for legal responsibility. One cannot be a proximate cause unless it is an actual cause, but one can be an actual cause without being the proximate cause.
An intervening cause may be (1) an act of God, (2) an act of an independent third party, or (3) an act or omission of the victim that assists in bringing about the outcome.
Proximate cause is an effort by the factfinder to determine whether holding the defendants criminally responsible for a prohibited result is proper.

Proximate Cause - People v. Rideout
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 2006
Court: Court of Appeals of Michigan
2. Disposition: Vacate the conviction for OWI/OWVI causing death.
3. Holding: The prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that defendant’s actions were a proximate cause of Keiser’s death.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: The trial court convicted Rideout of OWI and OWVI.
6. Facts: On November 23, 2003, Rideout was driving and turned north into the path of car driven by Reichelt. Reichelt’s car hit Rideout’s car. Rideout had a blood alcohol concentration of 0.16, twice the legal limit. Neither Reichelt nor Jonathan Keiser, his passenger, was seriously hurt. They went to speak with Rideout on the side of the road, where Rideout’s car had stopped. Reichelt then became concerned that because it was dark and his headlights were not working, oncoming cars might hit his car. Reichelt and Keiser went back to Reichelt’s car in the center of the road to check if the flashers worked. While standing next to the car, an oncoming car fatally hit Keiser.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: Defendant was intoxicated and caused the initial accident. Rideout’s driving was the factual or but-for cause of the second accident.
For Rideout’s conduct to be a proximate cause, the injury must be a direct and natural result of Rideout’s actions. Whether there was an intervening cause that superseded Rideout’s conduct is examined. The linchpin in the superseding cause analysis is whether the intervening cause was foreseeable based on an objective standard of reasonableness.
Court: a superseding intervening cause does not need to be the only cause. There was insufficient evidence to establish proximate cause at all. The second accident occurred after Keiser had reached a position of safety and reentered the roadway. -> renders the foreseeability of little value.
Whether intervening cause is superseding cause: (1) de minimis contribution to social harm factor, (2) the intended-consequences doctrine, (3) the omissions factor, (4) foreseeability factor, (5) apparent-safety doctrine,
A responsive intervening cause will establish proximate cause, while a coincidental intervening cause will not unless it was foreseeable.

Proximate Cause - Velazquez v. State
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1990
Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida
2. Disposition: Reverse the judgment and remand.
3. Holding: Alvarez did the actions himself and was the major cause of his own death.
4. Issue: Can a defendant driver of a motor vehicle who participates in a reckless and illegal drag race on a public road be properly convicted of vehicular homicide for the death of one of the co-participant drivers suffered in the course of the drag race?
5. Procedural History: The court convicted Velazquez of vehicular homicide.
6. Facts: On April 23, 1988, Velazquez and an acquaintance, Alvarez, agreed to race against each other in a drag race. They set the start line at the beginning of the road, near a guardrail overlooking a canal, and set the finish line a quarter-mile away from the canal. Velazquez and Alvarez completed the agreed-upon course. Alvarez then turned his car around and began racing towards the start line. Velazquez followed closely behind. Both were unable to apply their brakes in time to avoid crashing through the guardrail. Alvarez’s car went over the canal and he died instantly. Velazquez landed in the water and escaped to safety.
7. Rule: JAC v. State- grabbing the steering wheel and crashing was superseding the wrongful conduct.
8. Reasoning: Participating in the drag race was a cause-in-fact under the but for test. Participation was not a proximate cause of the death because Alvarez killed himself.

Concurrence of the elements – State v. Rose
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1973
Court: Supreme Court of Rhode Island
2. Disposition: Partially reverse.
3. Holding: It was error to deny motion for a directed verdict of acquittal for 70-572 but not 70-573 of leaving the scene of an accident.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: Rose moved for a directed verdict of acquittal on both counts, but the motion was denied.
6. Facts: Rose hit a pedestrian, David McEnery, with his car as McEnery was crossing the street. McEnery was thrown onto the hood of Rose's car. Rose stopped momentarily, McEnery rolled off the hood of the car, and Rose then drove away from the scene of the accident. McEnery’s body was later found underneath Rose’s abandoned car. Rose was charged with leaving the scene of the accident, death resulting, and also with negligent manslaughter. At trial, the only medical witness testified that McEnery could have died at the moment of impact, but he also could have died several minutes later. The medical witness could not state McEnery’s exact time of death.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: Rose argues that there was no evidence in the case of culpable negligence on the part up to and including the time at which McEnery was struck. Rose argues that, to find guilty of manslaughter, it would be necessary to find that McEnery was alive immediately after the impact and that the conduct of Rose following the impact constituted culpable negligence. Rose contends that McEnery was killed upon impact and was not alive at the time he was being dragged.

Degrees of Murder - State v. Guthrie
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1995
Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
2. Disposition: Reverse and remand.
3. Holding: Approve Hatfield instruction as proper.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: The jury convicted Guthrie of first degree murder.
6. Facts: Guthrie worked as a dishwasher at a restaurant. One evening, several of his co-workers began poking fun at him, including Farley who snapped Guthrie with a dishtowel several times. After Farley snapped Guthrie in the nose with the dishtowel, Guthrie became enraged, took a knife out of his pocket and stabbed Farley in the neck, killing him. Guthrie suffered from a host of psychiatric problems, including chronic depression (dysthymic disorder), obsession with his nose (dysmorphic disorder), panic attack, and borderline personality disorder.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: Guthrie asserts that the instructions regarding the elements of first degree murder were improper because the terms wilful, deliberate, and premeditated were equated with a mere intent.
The jury was instructed that murder in the first degree is when kills unlawfully, willfully, maliciously, deliberately (to reflect), and premeditatedly (to think of a matter before executed).
-The instruction collapsed the first and the second degree murders into one.
-premeditation: to think of a matter before it is executed. Deliberate: to reflect (cool, calm, and collected).


Degrees of Murder - Midgett v. State
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1987
Court: Supreme Court of Arkansas
2. Disposition: Reverse and remand.
3. Holding: There was no evidence of premeditation or deliberation which are required elements of the crime of first degree murder. Evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction of second degree murder, with the blow with the purpose of causing serious physical injury.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: In the trial court, Midgett was convicted of first degree murder.
6. Facts: Midgett’s daughter testified that several days before the son died, Midgett had been heavily drinking and began beating the son in the stomach and back with a closed fist. She had witnessed Midgett choking the son on several prior occasions. She attributed bruising on the son’s body over the past six months to Midgett. On the day of the son’s death, Midgett took the body to the hospital. The medical examiner concluded that the son died due to an abdominal hemorrhage caused by blunt force trauma. The trauma was consistent with injuries caused by a human fist.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: In spite of all this evidence of child abuse, there is no evidence that he killed Ronnie Jr. having premeditated and deliberated causing his death. The intention as to further abuse him or the intent to kill was developed in a drunken, heated, rage while disciplining the child.
Dissent: The repeated treatment was intended to kill the child. The jury found Midgett guilty and that should end the matter for us.
-We do not let juries speculate wildly. Reasoned jury should conclude.

Degrees of Murder - State v. Forrest
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1987
Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina
2. Disposition: Affirm.
3. Holding: There was substantial evidence that the killing was premeditated and deliberate:…, and defendant’s own statements following the incident.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: The jury convicted Forrest of first degree murder.
6. Facts: Forrest admitted his father to the hospital. Forrest’s father was deemed terminally ill shortly thereafter. On December 24, Forrest went to visit his father. While alone with him, Forrest began crying and told his father he loved him. His father began coughing and made gurgling noises. Forrest then removed a pistol from his pocket and fired it against his father’s head. He fired the gun a total of four times, cocking the gun each time before firing. Forrest then walked out of the room and dropped the gun, crying and appearing distressed. He openly admitted to shooting his father and said he promised his father he would not let him suffer.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: Forrest argues that the first-degree murder charge was improper because there was insufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation presented at trial. Court does not agree.

Manslaughter - Girouard v. State
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1991
Court: Court of Appeals of Maryland
2. Disposition: Affirm.
3. Holding: The provocation was not adequate to mitigate second degree murder to voluntary manslaughter.
4. Issue: Are words alone provocation adequate to justify a conviction of manslaughter? Are the taunting words enough to inflame the passion of a reasonable man so that that man would be sufficiently infuriated so as to strike out in hot-blooded blind passion to kill her?
5. Procedural History: Steven was convicted of second-degree murder.
6. Facts: Girouard and his wife Joyce had been married for about two months when they got into a heated argument. Joyce told Steven she did not love him and had never wanted to marry him, and she demanded a divorce. Joyce also informed Steven that she had filed charges against him for abuse with his commanding officer in the Army and told him he would probably be court-martialed. Steven lunged at Joyce with a kitchen knife and stabbed her 19 times, killing her.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: Stejskal, defense witness, states that Steven was out of touch with his own capacity to experience anger or express hostility and the events were consistent with Steven’s personality. Goldman another defense witness testified that Joyce had a compulsive need to provoke jealousy.
Girouard argues that the provocation to mitigate murder to manslaughter should not be limited only to the traditional circumstances; that manslaughter is homicide that lack malice; that there was provocation.
State argues that there are provocative acts that society does not recognize as reasonable. Abusive words alone could not mitigate murder to manslaughter.
Court: The difference between murder and manslaughter is the presence or absence of malice. We look to the circumstances and try to discover if the homicide was provoked by the victim. [Rule of Provocation]
-Voluntary manslaughter: an intentional killing committed in the heat of passion as the result of adequate provocation.

Provocation - People v. Cassasa
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1980
Court: Court of Appeals of New York
2. Disposition: Affirm.
3. Holding: Since the trier of fact found that Cassasa failed to establish that he was acting under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, Cassasa’s conviction should not be reduced.
4. Issue: Did Cassasa establish the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance which would have reduced the crime to manslaughter in the first degree?
5. Procedural History: Defense witness stated that Cassasa was under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance at the time. People’s witness stated that Cassasa was under a stress from within not external factors of emotional disturbance. Casassa was charged with second-degree murder.
6. Facts: Casassa lived in the same apartment complex as Victoria Lo Consolo. Shortly after they met, they began dating socially for a brief period. After Lo Consolo told Casassa that she was not “falling in love” with him, Casassa became devastated and undertook bizarre acts such as breaking into her apartment while she was away and lying in her bed naked for a while. During the break-in, Casassa was in possession of a knife “because he knew that he was either going to hurt Victoria or Victoria was going to cause himself to commit suicide.” After Lo Consolo rejected Casassa’s last attempt to win her over with wine, he took out a knife and stabbed her several times. Casassa then dragged her body into the bathroom and submerged her in a tub full of water to “make sure she was dead.”
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: Cassasa argues that the trial court did not afford him the benefit of the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance; that it refused to apply a subjective standard. Court: no.
Extreme emotional disturbance is significantly broader in scope than the heat of passion. Should the standard by which the reasonableness of defendant’s emotional reaction is to be tested be subjective?
The defense of extreme emotional disturbance- (1) the particular defendant must have acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance (subjective) and (2) there must have been a reasonable explanation or excuse for such extreme emotional disturbance. The ultimate test is objective; there must be reasonable explanation or excuse for the actor’s disturbance.
 The excuse offered by D was so peculiar to him that it was unworthy of mitigation. The murder was a result of D’s malevolence instead of human response deserving of mercy.

Unintentional Killings – People v. Knoller
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 2007
Court: Supreme Court of California
2. Disposition: Affirm.
3. Holding: Adopt straightforward language of the conscious disregard for human life definition of implied malice.
4. Issue: The definition of implied malice.
5. Procedural History: The jury convicted Knoller of second degree murder based on a theory of implied malice.
6. Facts: Knoller and her husband Robert Noel were attorneys who acquired four large dogs from a client. A veterinarian who examined the dogs for Knoller warned her that the dogs lacked any training or discipline and that they would be dangerous to keep at a home. He also implied that the dogs might attack humans. Despite the warnings, Knoller and Noel picked up the dogs from their former owner. While with the former owner, two of the dogs had attacked and killed the owner’s sheep and cat, and another ate his own doghouse. The former owner expressed her concern about all the dogs and suggested that two of them be shot. On April 30, 2000, Knoller and Noel brought two of the dogs to stay at their apartment. On January 26, 2001, the dogs attacked and killed Diane Whipple, who lived on the same floor.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: Knoller acknowledged not calling 911 to get help for Whipple. Prosecution presented evidence that the minor character of Knoller’s injuries indicated that she had not been as involved in trying to protect Whipple.
Malice may be express or implied. It is implied when no considerable provocation appears or when the circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart.
Implied malice is a killing by one with an abandoned and malignant heart and requires a defendant’s awareness of the risk of death to another. Two lines of decisions: (1) the defendant for a base, antisocial motive and with wanton disregard for human life, does an act that involves a high degree of probability that it will result in death. (2) the killing is proximately caused by an act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed by a person who knows that his conduct endangers the life of another and who acts with conscious disregard for life.

Unintentional Killing – State v. Williams
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1971
Court: Court of Appeals of Washington
2. Disposition: Affirm.
3. Holding: There is sufficient evidence, applying the standard of ordinary caution, that defendants were sufficiently put on notice to have required them to have obtained medical care for the child. The failure is ordinary or simple negligence, and such negligence is sufficient to support a conviction of statutory manslaughter.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: Walter and Bernice were charged with manslaughter.
6. Facts: Native Americans Walter and Bernice Williams were married. Before they were married, Bernice had two children. The younger child, William, became sick when he was about 17 months old. William had an abscessed tooth that developed into an infection of the mouth and cheeks. Walter and Bernice attempted to treat the problem using aspirin. William’s cheek started swelling up, he was not able to keep his food down, and his cheek turned bluish. William’s tooth then became gangrenous, and his resistance was reduced due to malnutrition. After this, William suffered from pneumonia and died. Walter and Bernice did not take William to the doctor because they did not realize how sick he was and were also afraid that if they went to the doctor, they would be reported to the welfare department, and William would be taken away from them.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: In the case of involuntary manslaughter, the breach had to amount to more than mere ordinary or simple negligence; gross negligence was essential. Ordinary caution is the kind a man of reasonable prudence would exercise under the same or similar conditions.
Infection lasted for two weeks and the last week would be too late to save the baby’s life.
-no conscious awareness of, if we continue the omission of providing care, the child will die.
-omission during the period the child should have been cared for.
-The only possibility to apply is negligent homicide 210.4.

The felony-murder rule: A felony + a killing = a murder.

The Felony-Murder Rule - People v. Fuller
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1978
Court: California Court of Appeal
2. Disposition: Reverse the judgment.
3. Holding: Felony-murder rule applies and Fuller can be prosecuted for first degree murder.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: The trial court struck the murder charges.
6. Facts: Fuller and an accomplice participated in the burglary of an automobile parked in a car lot. They broke into four vans on the lot and took spare tires from each of them. An officer observed Fuller and his accomplice rolling the tires to their car. The officer approached them to investigate. Fuller and his accomplice got into their car and sped away. While fleeing, they ran a red light and hit another car, causing the other driver’s death. Fuller was charged with murder under the felony-murder rule.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: All murder committed in the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate, arson, rape robbery, burglary, mayhem, or lewd acts with a minor is murder of the first degree. Strict liability… whether the killing was caused intentionally, negligently, or merely accidentally.
The ostensible purpose of the felony-murder rule is to deter those engaged in felonies from killing negligently or accidentally.

Felony murder rule rationale: deters negligent and accidental killings during commission of felonies; and deters dangerous felonies.

Inherently Dangerous Felony Limitation - Fisher v. State
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 2001
Court: Court of Appeals of Maryland
2. Disposition: Affirm.
3. Holding: Reject all three issues. The danger to life of a residual felony is determined by the nature of the crime or by the manner in which it was perpetrated in a given set of circumstances. The child abuse of the character and degree described in the evidence is inherently dangerous.
4. Issue: Are felonies that underlie felony under limited to those expressly incorporated in 408 through 410? Are additional felonies limited to crimes constituting felonies at common law? If statutory felonies creating offenses may be a basis for the doctrine, are the only qualifying crimes those which are inherently dangerous to life as determined by considering the elements of the crime in the abstract?
5. Procedural History: The trial court convicted both defendants of second degree felony murder.
6. Facts: In 1997 Rita Fisher, a nine-year-old child, died of dehydration and malnutrition. An autopsy revealed that Rita was neglected and physically abused before her death. Rita’s mother, Mary Utley, and sister, Rose Mary Fisher, were charged with child abuse and second-degree felony murder.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: Fisher alleges that many jurisdictions limit the predicate felonies to those that are dangerous to life.
-How do you determine the inherently dangerous? Two ways: (1) elements of the crime is inherently dangerous in the abstract, the way the statute was applied in the facts of the case.
-Govt: Determine whether there was a substantial risk that someone would be killed.

Facts-of-the-case approach: consider the manner in which the felony was perpetrated in the case at bar.
In the abstract: look solely at he elements of the offense as defined. A felony is inherently dangerous if the felony cannot be committed without creating a substantial risk that someone will be killed.

The Independent Felony limitation - People v. Smith
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1984
Court: Supreme Court of California
2. Disposition: Reverse and remand.
3. Holding: When a person willfully inflicts unjustifiable physical pain on a child, the assailant would not be further deterred by application of the felony-murder rule.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: Smith was convicted of child abuse and second-degree murder based on a theory of felony-murder.
6. Facts: Smith lived with her two-year-old daughter Amy. Amy refused to sit on the couch instead of the floor to eat a snack. In response, Smith took her daughter to the corner and began hitting her repeatedly. Smith knocked her daughter against a closet door and the daughter went into respiratory arrest. She died at the hospital.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: The felony-murder rule is inapplicable to felonies that are an integral part of and included in fact within the homicide. A second degree felony-murder instruction may not properly be given when it is based upon a felony which is an integral part of the homicide and which the evidence produced by the prosecution shows to be an offense included in fact within the offense charged.
The ostensible purpose of the felony-murder rule is not to deter the underlying felony, but instead to deter negligent or accidental killings that may occur in the course of committing that felony.
-independent felony (or merger) limitation

In the perpetration or in furtherance of a Felony – State v. Sophophone
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 2001
Court: Supreme Court of Kansas
2. Disposition: Reverse the conviction of felony-murder.
3. Holding: Making one criminally responsible for the lawful acts of a law enforcement officer is not the intent of the felony-murder statute.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and the jury convicted Sophophone of all counts.
6. Facts: Sophophone and three other men broke into a residence, committing aggravated burglary. The resident was home and called the police. When they arrived, one officer apprehended Sophophone while another chased down one of Sophophone’s accomplices, Sysoumphone. While the other officer held Sysoumphone to the ground, Sysoumphone fired a gun at him. The officer returned fire and killed Sysoumphone. Sophophone was charged with felony-murder based on the officer’s killing of Sysoumphone.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: Sophophone alleges that the police officer killed Sysoumphone and he was sitting in the police car; that he was in custody and the officer’s act was a break in circumstances (intervening).
Court: argument has no merits. The act was lawful by a third party and a question of law exists as to felony murder.
The Agency approach: felony-murder doctrine does not apply if the person who directly causes the death is a non-felon. A co-felon cannot be convicted of the homicides because the primary party was not the person with whom she was an accomplice.
The Proximate causation approach: a felon may be held responsible under the felony murder rule for a killing committed by a non-felon if the felon set in motion the acts which resulted in the victim’s death.
Court: We believe making one responsible for the lawful acts is not the intent of the statute…
Dissent: statute does not require to adopt the agency theory. An officer could have died.
-causal nexus needs to connect the felony and the death.

Res gestae includes the acts committed before, during or after the happening of the principal occurrence, when those acts are so closely connected with the principal occurrence as to form a part of the occurrence.
Unintended homicide that occurred during the commission of an unlawful act not amounting to a felony constituted involuntary manslaughter – misdemeanor-manslaughter rule.

Lee v. State
The history of the theft related offenses commenced with the common law courts’ concern for crimes of violence, robbery, and for protecting society against breaches of peace; then expanded by means of the ancient quasi-criminal writ of trespass to cover all taking of another’s property from his possession without his consent even though no force was used. This is larceny. Larceny is the trespassory taking and carrying away of personal property of another with intent to steal the same.

Larceny, Caption and Asportation - State v. Jones
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 2017
Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina
2. Disposition: Reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
3. Holding: Jones took West’s property by an act of trespass when he removed the excess funds from his account.
4. Issue: Did Jones take the property of another when he withdrew and transferred money from his bank account?
5. Procedural History: The jury found Jones guilty of three counts of larceny. The Court of Appeals vacated the convictions.
6. Facts: West gave its drivers the option to have money withheld every payroll period and placed in a maintenance account for the driver. Jones requested a $1,200 payment from the trucking company’s maintenance account. The payroll processor Hojecki accidentally typed $120,000, resulting in a deposit (after deductions) of $118,729.49 directly into Jones’s bank account. The processor realized the error the next morning, tried to stop the transaction, and told Jones not to withdraw or transfer. West tried to reverse the deposit. West’s reversal failed because Jones had already withdrawn or transferred almost all of the money.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: One is guilty of larceny if one (1) took the property of another; (2) carried it away; (3) without the owner’s consent; and (4) with the intent to deprive the owner of his property permanently.
A larcenous trespass is either actual (taking is without the consent of the owner) or constructive (possession of the property is fraudulently obtained by some trick or artifice).
Trespass must be against the possession of another.
West had constructive possession of the excess funds. West had the intent and capability to maintain control and dominion over the funds by effecting a reversal of the deposit. Jones’ removal of the funds deprived West of constructive possession, consistent with all larcenies.
Property remains in the constructive possession of the rightful possessor, and the later appropriation interferes with that property right. The moment he wrongfully interferes, he takes.
-Custody: have physical control of the property but their right to use it is substantially restricted. Look for situations where a person has access to the property for only a temporary period and under restricted conditions.

Larceny, Caption and Asportation - U.S. v. Mafnas
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1983
Court: US Court of Appeals, 9th circuit
2. Disposition: Affirm.
3. Holding: Mafnas committed the common law crime of larceny, replete with trespassory taking.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: The district court convicted Mafnas of larceny.
6. Facts: Mafnas was an employee of Guam Armored Car Service. He transported bags of money belonging to the Bank of Hawaii and the Bank of America. On three separatee occasions, Mafnas took money from the bags. He was tried and convicted under a federal statute that prohibits taking with the intent to steal money from a bank.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: Mafnas argues that he had lawful possession of the bags, with the consent of the banks, when he took the money.
District court: Mafnas committed larceny, because it was beyond the consent of the owner who retained constructive possession until the custodian’s task was completed.
Mafnas alleges that he is a bailee and the contract resulted in Service having lawful possession, not custody. -> Court: bailee who breaks bulk commits larceny. What was taken was property of banks.
-bail: to deliver in trust to another for a special purpose and for a limited period.
-bailee: when a bailee is entrusted by the bailor with a container for delivery, the bailee receives possession of the container but mere custody of its contents.

Larceny, of the Personal Property of Another - Lund v. Commonwealth
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1977
Court: Supreme Court of Virginia
2. Disposition: Reverse the judgment of the trial court and quash the indictment.
3. Holding: The print-outs had no ascertainable monetary value… the evidence was insufficient to convict under Code 18.1-100 or 18.1-118.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: Lund was found guilty of grand larceny and sentenced to two years in the state penitentiary.
6. Facts: Lund was a graduate student at Virginia Polytechnic Institute, where he was working on his dissertation. In order to complete his work, Lund required access to VPI’s computer and the computer-center personnel. After VPI received complaints of unauthorized computer use, Lund was found in possession of seven unauthorized keys, which he said he obtained from another student. He was also found in possession of several computer cards and printouts. Lund was charged with the theft of the keys, computer cards, computer printouts, and use of the computer and computer-center personnel while possessing the intent to defraud, with each property and service worth $100 or more.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: Lund argues that his conviction of grand larceny cannot be upheld because (1) there was no evidence that the articles were stolen or that they had a value of $100 or more, and (2) computer time and services are not the subject of larceny under the provisions.
Commonwealth: Lund violated when he obtained by false pretense or token, with intent to defraud, the computer print-outs.
Larceny by false pretense: make a false representation of an existing fact with knowledge of it falsity and, on that basis, obtain from another person money or other property which may be the subject of larceny, with the intent to defraud.
Goods and chattels cannot be interpreted to include computer time and services. Neither can be taken and carried away. Unauthorized use of the computer is not the subject of larceny because no “use”
The cost of producing the print-outs is not the proper criterion of value. The print-outs had no ascertainable monetary value.
-computer time is what is valuable

People v. Brown
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1894
Court: Supreme Court of California
2. Disposition: Reverse and remand.
3. Holding: The felonious intent must in all cases be an intent to wholly and permanently deprive the owner thereof.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: Brown was convicted of burglary.
6. Facts: Seventeen-year-old Brown entered an acquaintance’s house and took a bicycle with the intent to temporarily keep it. Brown was charged with burglary with the intent to commit larceny. At trial, Brown testified that he intended only to hold onto the bicycle for a short time to get even with a boy who was throwing oranges at him and would not stop. The trial judge gave the jury an instruction that the crime of larceny occurs regardless of how long Brown intended to keep the bicycle.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: You must find that the taker intended to deprive him of it permanently. If not there is no felonious intent and his acts constitute but a trespass.

People v. Davis
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1998
Court: Supreme Court of California
2. Disposition: Affirm.
3. Holding: The evidence supports the final two elements of larceny in feloniously steal and trespassory taking.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: The jury convicted Davis of petty theft. The Court of Appeal affirmed.
6. Facts: Davis went into a Mervyn’s department store carrying a Mervyn’s shopping bag. Davis took a shirt from a hanger, went to the sales counter, and requested a refund. A store security guard watched Davis do this and instructed the cashier to give Davis a store credit voucher. The cashier did so, and the security guard detained Davis. The State of California charged Davis with petty theft with a prior theft-related conviction. The state presented theft by larceny and theft by trick and device as theories to the jury.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: The elements of theft by larceny are one who (1) takes possession (2) of personal property (3) owned or possessed by another (4) by means of trespass (5) with intent to steal the property and (6) carries the property away.
Davis argues that the elements of trespass and intent to steal are lacking. Store consented to the issuance of the voucher with full knowledge of how he came to it. Court: the question is whether Mervyn’s consented to Davis’ taking the shirt in the first instance.
The intent to steal is an intent to deprive the owner permanently of possession of the property. Permanently is not literal. Intent to steal may be found (1) when the defendant intends to sell the property back to the owner; (2) to claim a reward for finding the property; and (3) to return the property to its owner for a refund.
A claim of the right to return an item taken from a store display is an assertion of a right of ownership. Such a taking creates a substantial risk of permanent loss, because he will keep it if fails.

Embezzlement – Rex v. Bazeley
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1799
Court: Central Criminal Court
2. Disposition:
3. Holding: If any servant or clerk, shall receive or take into his possession any money, goods, …, in the name or on the account of his master,… and shall fraudulently embezzle, …, every such offender shall be deemed to have feloniously stolen the same from his master or masters comployer,…
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History:
6. Facts: Bazeley was a teller at a bank owned by Esdaile and Hammett. In January 1799, a customer deposited bank notes and cash for an account. Bazeley deposited most of what he received into the account, but placed one bank note in his pocket, which he later converted to his own use. He was prosecuted for larceny.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: -Gilbert has a constructive possession and Cock is in custody of the money.
-we don’t have a larceny.
-First, have a lawful possession and then convert it to its own use.

People v. Ingram
Larceny by trick or device occurs when the defendant obtains possession of another’s property by fraud or trickery.
False pretenses: through false representations and with the intent to steal, obtains both possession and title to property.
The defendant who obtains property by larceny does not obtain title and… by false pretenses does obtain title.
-misrepresentation about an existing fact.

False Pretenses – People v. Whight
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1995
Court: California Court of Appeal
2. Disposition: Affirm.
3. Holding: Safe elected to take the risk and to rely solely on Whight’s representation. The element of reliance or causation was indisputably established.
4. Issue: Larceny by trick and false pretenses
5. Procedural History: A jury convicted Whight with grand theft by false pretenses.
6. Facts: Whight opened a checking account and overdrew. The bank closed his account, but Whight discovered that the ATM card still worked at certain Safeway markets. Each time a customer used an ATM card, Safeway’s computer system communicated with Wells Fargo to verify the cards. But if Wells Fargo was unable to communicate with the customer’s bank, it would simply issue Safeway a stand-in code to approve the transaction. Safeway would issue the money and later verify the ATM card. Whight used his ATM card at four Safeway markets and withdrew over $19,000.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: Whight contends his convictions for grand theft by false pretense must be reversed because Safeway relied on the code by Wells Fargo, not his presentation, in approval. Safeway did not actually rely on his implied representation.
To convict by false pretenses, it must be shown (1) that the defendant made a false pretense or representation, (2) that the representation was made with intent to defraud the owner of his property, and (3) that the owner was in fact defrauded in that he parted with his property in reliance upon the representation.
It is required that the victim pass title to his property in reliance upon the misrepresentation. -> the false pretense must have materially influenced the owner to part with his property, but it need not be the sole inducing cause.

The Resistance Requirement - Rusk v. State
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1979
Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
2. Disposition: Reverse and remand.
3. Holding: We find the evidence legally insufficient to warrant a conclusion that appellant’s words or actions created in the mind of the victim a reasonable fear.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: Rusk was convicted of rape.
6. Facts: Prosecutrix was a 20 year old mother of a 2 year old son. She was separated from her husband. She attended a high school reunion and went bar hopping. At the third bar, she met Rusk who requested her a ride home. At Rusk’s home, he asked her to come up to his apartment. She became afraid and stated that it might cause her marital problems if she were followed by a detective. Rusk took the car keys, opened the car door and asked her to come up. She followed Rusk into the apartment. She made no attempt to leave. Rusk asked her to get on the bed. She asked to let her leave but Rusk refused and performed sexual intercourse.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: Court: unable to see any resistance on her part and can see no fear as would overcome her attempt to resist or escape. The way he looked fails to support the fear required.
Dissent: A type of second degree rape is (1) engages in vaginal intercourse with another person (2) by force or threat of force (3) against the will and (4) without the consent of the other person. The only issue is whether there was sufficient evidence of force or the threat of force. (1) if the acts and threats created a real apprehension (2) submission is not the equivalent of consent and (3) the real test is whether the assault was committed without the consent. Majority simply concluded that her fear was not a reasonable one or that there was no fear at all.

The Resistance Requirement – State v. Rusk
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1981
Court: Court of Appeals of Maryland
2. Disposition: Reverse and remand.
3. Holding: The reasonableness of Pat’s apprehension of fear was plainly a question of fact for the jury to determine.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland found that evidence was insufficient to convict appellant of rape.
6. Facts:
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: Dissent: in the absence of any verbal threat to do her grievous bodily harm or the display of any weapon and threat to use it, how is it not willing.

Redefining Force - Commonwealth v. Berkowitz
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1992
Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
2. Disposition: Reverse and remand.
3. Holding: Discharge Berkowitz as to the rape conviction.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: The trial court found that the evidence adduced by the Commonwealth was sufficient to convict Berkowitz of rape and indecent assault.
6. Facts: Berkowitz and the victim were at East Stroudsburg State University. The victim returned to her dormitory room at 2:00. She drank a martini and went to his boyfriend’s dorm. She walked up to Berkowitz’s room to look for Earl Hassel. She wrote a note to Hassel and found Berkowitz lying on the bed. Berkowitz asked her to hang out and asked for a back rub and sitting on his bed but she declined. Berkowitz started kissing and fondling her. She said no and that she had to go. Berkowitz locked the door and pushed her onto the bed. Berkowitz sexually assaulted her and she dressed up and left. Her boyfriend called the police.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: Before us is not a case of mental coercion. The atmosphere and physical setting was not coercive. Victim was not under duress. There is no threat of forcible compulsion. Commonwealth: victim did not consent so it was forcible compulsion. Court: victim’s testimony as to the physical aspects cannot serve as a basis for forcible compulsion.
The victim repeatedly and continually said no. The evidence of verbal protestations is not dispositive or sufficient evidence of forcible compulsion.

Rape as Non-consensual Sexual Intercourse – State of New Jersey in the interest of M.T.S.
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1992
Court: Supreme Court of New Jersey
2. Disposition: Reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division.
3. Holding: Reinstate the disposition of juvenile delinquency for the commission of second-degree sexual assault.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: The trial court adjudicated M.T.S. delinquent. The Appellate Court reversed the adjudication.
6. Facts: Fifteen-year-old C.G. lived with multiple people including M.T.S. C.G. went upstairs to sleep. C.G. woke up at 1:30 a.m. to use the bathroom and saw M.T.S. standing in her doorway. C.G. next woke up with M.T.S. on top of her. C.G. slapped M.T.S. and told him to get off her and get out. According to M.T.S., the two were kissing and all and undressed each other before the intercourse.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: State reads physical force to any amount of sexual touching brought about involuntarily. The public Defender reads it as force used to overcome lack of consent.
In 1796, rape consisted of carnal knowledge of victim forcibly against its will.
Critics of rape law alleged that the focus should be shifted from the victim’s behavior to the defendant’s conduct, and particularly to its forceful and assaultive character.
Avoid a definition of force that depended on the reaction of the victim: abandon resistance requirement.
The reform statute defines sexual assault as penetration by use of physical force or coercion but it does not define either. Permission must be affirmative and given freely.
The State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there was sexual penetration without the affirmative and freely-given permission of the alleged victim.

Strict liability offenses - Garnett v. State
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1993
Court: Court of Appeals of Maryland
2. Disposition:
3. Holding: Maryland’s second degree rape statute is by nature a creature of legislation. Any provision introducing mens rea should be from an act of the Legislature.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: Raymond was convicted of rape as a strict liability offense since there was vaginal intercourse, Frazier was under 14 years old, and Garnett was at least four years older than she.
6. Facts: Garnett is mentally handicapped. At the age of twenty, when the events in question occurred, his social development mirrored that of an eleven or twelve-year-old. Garnett was introduced to a thirteen-year-old girl named Erica Frazier in late 1990. On February 28, 1991, Frazier invited Garnett into her bedroom and they engaged in sexual intercourse. Frazier gave birth to a baby.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: Statutory rape laws are often justified on the moral wrong theory.
Section 463(a)(3) is silent as to mens rea, indicating that the Legislature made statutory rape a more severe prohibition based on strict criminal liability.
The drafting history of section 463 reveals that the statute was viewed as one of strict liability.
Dissent: section 463 does not contain no mens rea at all. The statutory language, legislative history, and penalty provision indicate that the General Assembly did not intend to create a pure strict liability offense.

Failure of Proof Defenses: Because of the conditions that are the basis for the defense, all elements of the offense charged cannot be proven.
Offense modifications: Apply even where all elements of the offense are satisfied. They introduce criminalization decisions similar to those used in defining offenses. They operate to modify the definition of offenses.
Justifications: Under special justifying circumstances, harm is outweighed by the need to avoid an even greater harm or to further a greater societal interest.
Excuses: general defenses applicable to all offenses even though the elements of the offense are satisfied. Admit that the deed may be wrong, but excuse the actor because conditions suggests that the actor is not responsible for the deed.
Nonexculpatory public policy defenses: The statute of limitations may bar a conviction to foster a more stable and forward looking society.

Burden of proof - Patterson v. New York
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1977
Court: Supreme Court of the US
2. Disposition: Affirm the judgment of the New York Court of Appeals.
3. Holding:
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: Patterson was charged with second degree murder and raised the defense of extreme emotional disturbance and was convicted. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
6. Facts: Patterson was estranged from his wife, Roberta, who associated with Northrup. Patterson borrowed a rifle from an acquaintance and went to the residence of his father-in-law. Patterson saw Roberta in semiundress in the presence of Northrup and killed Northrup.
7. Rule: Mullaney
8. Reasoning:

To be justified, the responsive conduct must: (1) be necessary to protect or further the interest at stake, and (2) cause only a harm that is proportional or reasonable in relation to the harm threatened or the interest to be furthered.
Necessity requirement: the defendant act only when and to the extent necessary to protect or further the interest at stake.
Proportionality requirement: places a limit on the maximum harm that may be used in protection or furtherance of an interest.
“Public benefit” theory:
(1) When a public officer was commanded to take a life; (2) when a public officer, although not commanded to do so, took a life in order to advance the public welfare; and (3) when a private party took a life in order to prevent the commission of a forcible, atrocious felony.
“Moral forfeiture” theory: People possess certain moral rights or interests that society recognizes through its criminal laws, e.g. the right to life, but which may be forfeited by the holder of the right.
“Moral Rights” theory: the actor has a right to protect a particular moral interest. Focuses on the interests of the innocent defendant. Provides the actor with an affirmative right to protect her threatened moral interest.
“Superior Interest” theory: interests of the defendant outweigh those of the person whom she harms.

Self-defense – U.S. v. Peterson
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1973
Court: US Court of Appeals, DC Circuit
2. Disposition: Affirm.
3. Holding: Remit the issue to the jury of whether Peterson’s conduct was an invitation to and provocation of the encounter.
4. Issue: Was the instruction that the jury might consider whether Peterson was the aggressor in the altercation in error? Was the instruction that a failure by Peterson to retreat be considered as a circumstance bearing on the question whether he was justified in using the force?
5. Procedural History: Peterson was convicted for second-degree murder.
6. Facts: Keitt and two friends drove to the alley in the rear of Peterson’s house to remove the windshield wipers from Peterson’s wrecked car. Peterson protested and, after a verbal exchange, he returned with a pistol. Peterson shouted that he will shoot if Keitt moves and kill him if Keitt comes in. Keitt took a lug wrench and advanced toward Peterson. Peterson warned to not take another step and Keitt did, and Peterson shot and killed Keitt.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: Right to kill or main in self defense – There must have been a threat actual or apparent, of the use of deadly force against the defender. The threat must have been unlawful and immediate. The defender must have believed that he was in imminent peril of death or serious bodily harm, and that his response was necessary to save himself therefrom.
One who is the aggressor in a conflict culminating in death cannot invoke the necessities of self-preservation.
It was not until Peterson fetched his pistol and returned that the confrontation took on a deadly cast. When Peterson reappeared with his pistol, Keitt was about to depart the scene.
Retreat to the wall: forbade the use of deadly force by one to whom an avenue for safe retreat was open.
Castle doctrine: one who through no fault of his own is attacked in his home is under no duty to retreat. Court: the right to self-defense cannot be claimed by the aggressor in an affray so long as he retains that unmitigated role.
-Majority rule: stand your ground. Minority(Peterson): retreat if it can be done safely.

Reasonable belief requirement - People v. Goetz
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1986
Court: Court of Appeals of New York
2. Disposition: Reverse and reinstate all counts of the indictment.
3. Holding:
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: The grand jury indicted Goetz on attempted murder, assault, and other charges. The lower court granted Goetz’s motion to dismiss, reasoning that the prosecutor erroneously introduced an objective element by instructing to consider whether Goetz’s conduct was that of a reasonable man in his situation; statutory test for justification should be subjective, focusing on the defendant’s state of mind.
6. Facts: Four youths and Goetz were in the rear portion of the train. Goetz carried an unlicensed pistol. Canty and Allen approached Goetz and stated “give me five dollars.” Goetz responded by standing up, pulling out his handgun and firing four shots at four youths. Goetz fired another shot at Cabey that severed his spinal cord. Goetz told the conductor that the four youths tried to rob him. Goetz fled but surrendered to police.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: 35.15(1)- a person may use physical force when and to the extent he reasonably believes such to be necessary to defend himself or a third person from what he reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force by such other person.
35.15(2)- a person may not use deadly physical force… unless (a) he reasonably believes that such other person is using or about to use deadly physical force or (b) he reasonably believes that other person is committing or attempting to commit a kidnapping, forcible rape, forcible sodomy or robbery.
Triggering conditions – reasonably believes. Need- such force is necessary to avert.
Reasonably should retain an objective element as part of a provision. The provisions have uniformly required that the belief comport with an objective notion of reasonableness.
A determination of reasonableness must be based on the circumstances facing a defendant or his situation.

Necessity - Nelson v. State
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1979
Court: Supreme Court of Alaska
2. Disposition: Affirm the conviction.
3. Holding:
4. Issue: Whether the jury was properly instructed on the defense of necessity.
5. Procedural History: Nelson was convicted of reckless destruction of personal property and joyriding. The Appellate Court affirmed.
6. Facts: Nelson drove his four-wheel drive truck onto a side road off the highway. His truck became bogged down. Nelson and his companions were unsuccessful in freeing the vehicle. An acquaintance drove them to a Highway Department Yard. After waiting several hours for someone to come by, they took a dump truck that also became stuck. Curly’s vehicle was also stuck further down. They took a front-end loader from the yard that freed the dump truck and Curly’s car. Nelson attempted to free his own truck and the front-end loader became bogged down. Damage was done to the front-end loader and the dump truck. They slept and was charged with reckless destruction of personal property and joyriding.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: Nelson: the instruction was erroneous because it applies “objective, after-the-fact” test of need and emergency rather than a “subjective, reasonable man” test.
Necessity defense: (1) the act charged must have been done to prevent a significant evil; (2) there must have been no adequate alternative; (3) the harm caused must not have been disproportionate to the harm avoided.
Court: “emergency” was that his truck might tip over, but it did not tip over 12 hours later. Lawful alternatives were helps people stopped and offered. The seriousness of the offenses were disproportionate to the situation Nelson faced.

Duress - U.S. v. Contento-Pachon
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1984
Court: US Court of Appeals 9th Circuit
2. Disposition: Reverse.
3. Holding: Contento acted under an immediate and well-grounded threat… with no opportunity to escape. The trier of fact should have been allowed to consider the credibility of the proffered evidence.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: The govt moved to exclude the defense of duress and necessity and the motion was granted.
6. Facts: Contento in Colombia heard from a taxicab passenger, Jorge, about a job as the driver of a privately-owned car. Jorge proposed Contento swallow cocaine-filled balloons and transport them to the US. Contento did not contact the police because he believed they are corrupt. One week later, Contento told Jorge he would not carry. Jorge told Contento that his failure to cooperate would result in the death of his wife and three-year-old child. Contento swallowed 129 balloons of cocaine. Contento consented to have his stomach x-rayed at the customs in L.A. The x-rays revealed cocaine.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: Three elements of the duress defense: (1) an immediate threat of death or serious bodily injury, (2) a well-grounded fear that the threat will be carried out, and (3) no reasonable opportunity to escape the threatened harm.
Immediacy: If Contento refused to cooperate the consequences would be immediate and harsh.
Escapability: no reasonable avenue of escape -> Contento presented a triable issue on this.
Traditionally, for the necessity defense to apply, the coercion must have had its source in the physical forces of nature. Duress negate the existence of the requisite mens rea for the crime in question, whereas under necessity there is no actus reus. -> no physical force and did not act for the general welfare.
-Under MPC, unlawful force refers to human force.

Intoxication - U.S. v. Veach
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 2006
Court: US Court of Appeals 6th Circuit
2. Disposition: Reverse Veach’s 115 convictions and remand.
3. Holding: Veach should have been allowed to present evidence to the jury that he was too intoxicated at the time of his arrest to form the requisite specific intent.
4. Issue: Did the court err in granting the government’s motion in limine to exclude presentation of a defense of voluntary intoxication?
5. Procedural History: The jury convicted Veach of resisting a federal law enforcement officer and threatening to assault and murder an officer with intent to impede such officer in the performance of official duties.
6. Facts: Veach’s automobile was involved in a collision and Rangers suspected and confirmed that Veach was intoxicated. While securing Veach for transport, Ranger struggled with Veach, who attempted to pull away. Veach pulled the officer down and verbally threatened Ranger as he was driven to the police station. Veach was transported to a hospital for treatment of a facial cut and again threatened Ranger. On the way back to the detention center, Veach again threatened Ranger.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: Intoxication may preclude the formation of specific-intent and negate an essential element of certain crimes. May negate the mens rea of a specific-intent crime and not general intent.
Voluntary intoxication is not a viable defense to charge of a violation of 111.
115(a)(1)(B) requires not only that Veach threatened but also that he made such a threat for the specific purpose of interfering with the performance of official duties or of retaliating for the performance of such duties. It contains a specific intent element that must be proven…
-distinction is relevant where voluntary intoxication defense
-there was resisting of arrest. Whether voluntary intoxication can be excused.
-111(a)(1), battery is a general intent crime. General crime, cannot use voluntary intoxication.

Coerced intoxication: intoxication involuntarily induced by reason of duress or coercion.
Pathological intoxication: intoxication grossly excessive in degree, given the amount of the intoxicant, to which the actor does not know he is susceptible.
Intoxication by innocent mistake: Mistake about the character of the substance taken when another person has tricked him into taking substance.
Unexpected intoxication: unexpectedly intoxicated due to the ingestion of a medically prescribed drug.
Involuntarily intoxicated is acquitted if he does not form the mens rea for the offense (lacks specific intent of the offense) as a result.
Entitled to acquittal when involuntary intoxication renders him temporarily insane.

Mental illness does not in and of itself eliminate criminal responsibility. A criminal trial may not proceed if the defendant is incompetent to stand trial. This is a separate question from whether the defendant is legally insane. A defendant is competent if he has sufficient present ability to consult with the defense lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and if he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.
A state may presume that a defendant is competent and require her to prove her incompetency by a preponderance of evidence. It violates due process to impose a stricter burden. If incompetent, committed to a mental health facility.
A defendant would assert a special plea of not guilty by reason of insanity (pre-trial).
Guilty but mentally ill verdict is allowed if the prosecutor proves beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements of the crime, but no defenses are proven and the defendant suffers from a mental illness.
Majority of states place the burden of persuasion regarding sanity on the defendant.
In some states, an acquittee is automatically committed to a facility. In others, law requires observation.

Insanity - U.S. v. Freeman
What segment of society can feel its desire for retribution satisfied when it wreaks vengeance upon the incompetent.

Wild beast test: the defendant was not excused unless he was totally deprived of his reason, understanding, and memory, and did not know what he was doing any more than a wild beast. The capacity to distinguish right from wrong was then put forward as another test.

Insanity - State v. Johnson
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1979
Court: Supreme Court of Rhode Island
Legal standard designed to assess criminal responsibility should: accurately reflect the underlying principles of substantive law and community values while comporting with the realities of scientific understanding, phrased in order to make fully available to the jury such psychiatric information, be comprehensible to the experts, lawyers, and jury, and the judgment must preserve its full authority.
The language shifted its emphasis from good or evil to know. M’Naghten rule: to establish a defense on the ground of insanity it must be clearly proved that the party accused was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it, that he did not know that what he was doing was wrong.
The test’s emphasis upon knowledge of right or wrong abstracts a single element of personality as the sole symptom or manifestation of mental illness. It refuses to recognize volitional or emotional impairments. It has all-or-nothing approach. It severely restricts expert testimony, depriving the jury of a true picture of the defendant’s mental condition.
Irresistible impulse test: inquire into both the cognitive and volitional components of the defendant’s behavior. It produces the misleading notion that a crime impulsively committed must have been perpetrated in a sudden and explosive fit.
The product test: an accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or mental defect. It was designed to facilitate full and complete expert testimony and to permit the jury to consider all relevant information, rather than restrict its inquiry to data relating to a sole symptom or manifestation of mental illness. Problem: tendency to result in expert witnesses’ usurpation of the jury function. (but for causation; if product of mental disease or defect)
The MPC relieves the defendant of responsibility (1) when, as a result of mental disease or defect, the defendant lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct; (2) when as a result of mental disease or defect, the defendant lacked substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. Adopts the standard of substantial capacity.

When a person is seriously dedicated to commission of a crime, a firm legal basis is needed for the intervention of the agencies of law enforcement to prevent its consummation. Conduct designed to cause or culminate in the commission of a crime obviously yields an indication that the actor is disposed towards such activity, not alone on this occasion but on others. When the actor’s failure to commit the substantive offense is due to a fortuity, his exculpation would involve inequality of treatment that would shock the common sense of justice.

Attempt, conspiracy and solicitation are defined broadly to encompass acts leading to the commission of any completed crime. Primary function of the crime of attempt is to provide a basis for law enforcement officers to intervene before an individual can commit a completed offense.

Mens Rea - People v. Gentry
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: Appellate Court of Illinois, 1st district
Court: 1987
2. Disposition: Reverse the conviction and remand.
3. Holding: We recognize the distinction between the alternative states of mind delineated in the definitional murder instruction, and only the specific intent to kill satisfies the intent element of the crime of attempt murder.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: The trial court instructed on attempt and the crime of murder.
6. Facts: Gentry and Ruby Hill had been drinking. They began to argue and Gentry spilled gasoline on Hill. The gasoline ignited when Hill went near the stove and severely burned Hill. Gentry snuff the fire out with a coat.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: A person commits attempt when he, with intent to commit the offense of murder does any act which constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of the offense of murder.
Gentry contends that the inclusion of all the alternative states of mind was erroneous because the crime of attempt murder requires a showing of specific intent to kill.
Finding of specific intent to kill is a necessary element of the crime of attempt murder. Court: the State made no distinction between the mental state required for murder and attempt murder.
-Impossible to attempt to do something unintentionally. Attempted murder requires specific intent to kill.

Criminal attempts involve two intents: the actors’ conduct itself, and the actor must intend to commit the completed offense. The latter intent must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Attempts involve intents: the actor’s conduct must be intentional and the actor must, while engaged in the conduct constituting the attempt, intend to commit the completed offense (beyond reasonable dbt).

Mens Rea - Bruce v. State
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1989
Court: Court of Appeals of Maryland
2. Disposition: Reverse.
3. Holding: Because a conviction for felony murder requires no specific intent to kill, because a criminal attempt is a specific intent crime, attempted felony murder is not a crime.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: A jury found Bruce guilty of attempted first degree felony murder, robbery with a deadly weapon, and two handgun charges.
6. Facts: Three men entered Tensor’s shoe store. Bruce ordered Tensor to open the cash register but it was empty. Bruce aimed pistol at Tensor’s head, Tensor ducked down and moved forward, and Bruce shot Tensor in the stomach.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: 410 Felony murder doctrine; to secure a conviction for first degree murder under the felon murder doctrine, the State is required to prove a specific intent to commit the underlying felony… it is not necessary to prove a specific intent to kill…
A criminal attempt consists of a specific intent to commit the offense coupled with some overt act in furtherance of the intent which goes beyond mere preparation.

Actus Reus - U.S. v. Mandujano
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1974
Court: US Court of Appeals, 5th circuit
The courts in many jurisdictions have tried to elaborate on the distinction between mere preparation and attempt.

Distinguishing Preparation from Perpetration - Commonwealth v. Peaslee
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1901
Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Mass.
2. Disposition: Reverse.
3. Holding: A mere collection and preparation of materials in a room for the purpose of setting fire to them, unaccompanied by any present intent to set the fire, would be too remote.
4. Issue: Is Peaslee’s act near enough to the accomplishment of the substantive offense to be punishable?
5. Procedural History: Peaslee was indicted for an attempt to burn.
6. Facts: Peaslee constructed and arranged combustibles in the building in a way that they were ready to be lighted. Peaslee offered to pay a younger man to light fire but was refused. Peaslee drove toward the building but changed his mind and drove away.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: In some cases, a would-be criminal may change his mind. Such first steps are not an attempt because that word suggests an act seemingly sufficient to accomplish the end. An overt act commonly is not punishable if further acts are contemplated as needful; preparation is not an attempt. If the preparation comes very near to the accomplishment of the act, the intent to complete it renders the crime so probable.
-last act test

• The physical proximity doctrine - the overt act required for an attempt must be proximate to the completed crime, or directly tending toward the completion of the crime, or must amount to the commencement of the consummation. (default)
• The dangerous proximity doctrine - a test given impetus by Mr. Justice Holmes whereby the greater the gravity and probability of the offense, and the nearer the act to the crime, the stronger is the case for calling the act an attempt. (more flexible test when it comes to a more serious offense)
• The indispensable element test - a variation of the proximity tests which emphasizes any indispensable aspect of the criminal endeavor over which the actor has not yet acquired control.
• The probable desistance test - the conduct constitutes an attempt if, in the ordinary and natural course of events, without interruption from an outside source, it will result in the crime intended.
• The res ipsa loquitur or unequivocality test - an attempt is committed when the actor’s conduct manifests an intent to commit a crime

Distinguishing Preparation from Perpetration - People v. Rizzo
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1927
Court: Court of Appeals of New York
2. Disposition: Reverse the judgment of conviction and grant a new trial.
3. Holding: Defendants had planned to commit a crime but the opportunity fortunately never came.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: Rizzo was convicted of an attempt to commit the crime of robbery in the first degree and sentenced to prison.
6. Facts: Rizzo and three others planned to rob Rao of a payroll valued at $1200 to carry from the bank to the ULC. Rizzo and three looked for Rao in their car and were followed by two police officers. As Rizzo jumped out of the car and ran into the building all four were arrested. Rao was not at the place, and Rizzo pointed out or identified no one with a payroll.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: Hyde v. US: attempt when it is so near to the result that the danger of success is very great.
C v. Peaslee: Attempt is coming very near to the accomplishment of the crime.

Attempt - People v. Miller
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1935
Court: Supreme Court of California
2. Disposition: Reverse.
3. Holding: No one could say with certainty whether the defendant had come into the field to carry out his threat to kill or merely to demand his arrest by the constable. The acts do not constitute an attempt to commit murder.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: The jury found Miller guilty as charged in the amended information.
6. Facts: Miller threatened to kill Jeans. Jeans was employed at a hop ranch owned by Ginochio and was planting hops when Miller entered the hop field with a rifle. Miller walked in a direct line toward Ginochio. In the middle, Miller loaded his rifle. When Jeans saw Miller, he fled. Miller continued toward GInochio, who took the gun and Miller did not resist.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning:

Attempt - State v. Reeves
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1996
Court: Supreme Court of Tennessee
2. Disposition: Affirm the conviction.
3. Holding: When an actor possesses materials to be used in the commission of a crime, at or near the scene of the crime, and where the possession of those materials can serve no lawful purpose, the jury is entitled to find a “substantial step.”
4. Issue: Did Reeves’ actions constitute a substantial step toward the commission of second degree murder?
5. Procedural History: Carroll County Juvenile Court found Reeves and Coffman delinquent. A jury found attempt to commit second degree murder and the trial court affirmed.
6. Facts: Reeves and Coffman, twelve years old, decided to kill their homeroom teacher, Geiger. Coffman would bring rat poison and place it in Geiger’s drink. They would steal Geiger’s car and drive to the Smoky Mountains. Reeves contacted Foutch to drive the car, and Foutch refused. Coffman placed a packet of rat poison in her purse and told about her plan to Hernandez in the bus. Hernandez informed Cockrill and Cockrill relayed to the principal Argo. Geiger saw Reeves and Coffman leaning over her desk and the purse. Argo called Coffman to the principal’s office and rat poison was turned over.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: To submit criminal attempt, the State was required to present evidence of: (1) an intent to commit a specific crime; (2) an overt act toward the commission of that crime; and (3) a failure to consummate the crime. To draw a distinction between mere preparation and a direct movement toward the commission, courts construed overt act narrowly.
Deputy: the element of attempt, overt act, does not appear in this record. Reprehensible conduct would have resulted had he not been thwarted by the arrival of the police, but he did not use any of the instruments or touch the body of the girl.
State: the issue is a jury question and the jury was justified in finding her guilty.
Reeves: the legislature intended to retain the sharp distinction between mere preparation and the act itself.
Preventing inchoate crimes from becoming full-blown ones -> endangers the public and undermines the preventative goal of attempt law.

Impossibility - People v. Thousand
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 2001
Court: Supreme Court of Michigan
2. Disposition: Reverse the judgment.
3. Holding: The nonexistence of a minor victim does not give rise to a viable defense to the attempt charge.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: Thousand brought a motion to quash the information, because a child victim was not existent. The circuit court dismissed the case and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
6. Facts: Liezbinski was instructed at Sheriff’s department to pose as a minor and log onto chat rooms to identify persons using the Internet in criminal activity. Liezbinski posed as a minor female and Chris Thousand made lewd invitations to Bekka. Sheriffs took custody of Thousand at the restaurant they intended to meet at.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: Factual impossibility exists when the intended end constitutes a crime but she fails to consummate it because of a factual circumstance unknown to her or beyond her control.
Pure legal impossibility applies when an actor engages in conduct that he believes is criminal but is not actually prohibited by law.
Hybrid legal impossibility exists if D’s goal was illegal, but commission of the offense was impossible due to a factual mistake by her regarding the legal status of some factor relevant to her conduct. Both legal and factual aspects exist. (factual mistake goes to the legal nature of the property)
Impossibility has never been recognized by this court as a valid defense to attempt. An attempt consists of (1) an attempt to commit an offense prohibited by law, and (2) any act towards the commission of the intended offense. An intent to do an act or to bring about certain consequences which would in law amount to a crime, and an act in furtherance of that intent which goes beyond mere preparation.
Thousand is charged with the offense of attempt, which requires only that the prosecution prove intention to commit an offense prohibited by law, coupled with conduct toward the commission of that offense.
Dissent: legal impossibility is a viable defense. It was legally impossible to have committed the charged offense.

Abandonment – Commonwealth v. McCloskey
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1975
Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
2. Disposition: Vacate the judgment of sentence and discharge the conviction.
3. Holding: McCloskey was still within the prison, still only contemplating a prison breach, and not yet attempting the act. He was in a position to abandon the criminal offense.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: McCloskey was found guilty of attempted prison breach.
6. Facts: McCloskey was serving 1-3 year sentence for larceny. Larson a Guard Supervisor at the prison, heard an alarm go off indicating that someone was attempting escape. The guards found one piece of barbed wire that had been cut and a laundry bag filled with civilian clothing. McCloskey explained to Larson that he made a break last night but changed his mind because he thought about his family. McCloskey was depressed because he was denied a Christmas furlough.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: Concurring: Disagrees that the acts done to abandon his escape were insufficient to constitute an attempt. Recognizes voluntary abandonment as an affirmative defense.
-Majority: he never attempted to escape from the prison.

Mayhem: common law felony where injury permanently impairs the victim’s ability to defend himself or to annoy his adversary.
Battery: common law misdemeanor of any unlawful application of force to the person of another wilfully or in anger.
Assault: An unlawful attempt, coupled with a present ability, to commit a violent injury on the person of another.

Solicitation - State v. Mann
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1986
Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina
Solicitation involves the asking, enticing, inducing, or counselling of another to commit a crime.

At common law, a solicitation was indictable as a misdemeanor. The offense is complete as soon as the solicitor asks, entices, or encourages another to commit the target offense. A solicitation may consist of nothing more than an attempt to conspire with another to commit an offense, which makes solicitation a double inchoate offense.

Solicitation - State v. Cotton
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1990
Court: Court of Appeals of New Mexico
2. Disposition: Reverse Cotton’s convictions for solicitation and remand.
3. Holding:
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: Cotton was convicted of two counts of criminal solicitation (bribery or intimidation of a witness and custodial interference).
6. Facts: In 1986, Cotton, Gail, and children moved to New Mexico. Gail and children returned to Indiana and the stepdaughter moved back to New Mexico to live with Cotton. In 1987, Cotton was arrested and charged with criminal sexual penetration and contact of a minor. Cotton discussed with Dobbs at jail about his desire to persuade his stepdaughter not to testify against him. Cotton wrote letters to Gail discussing his strategy for defense. In one, Cotton asked Gail to persuade his stepdaughter not to testify at the trial. Cotton urged Gail to influence the stepdaughter to leave the state. Dobbs gave the letter to the law enforcement authorities. Cotton wrote another letter to warn his stepdaughter.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: Cotton argues that the record fails because Gail never received the two letters.
State argues that Cotton’s acts of writing the letters, attempts to mail, and his specific intent to solicit the commission of a felony constitutes sufficient proof to sustain a charge of criminal solicitation.
Omission in Section 30-28-3 is an implicit legislative intent that the offense of solicitation requires some form of actual communication from the defendant to either an intermediary or the person intended to be solicited, indicating the subject matter of the solicitation.

The mens rea of solicitation encompasses (1) the intent to perform the acts constituting the solicitation and (2) the specific intent that the other person commit the solicited offense.

Whether the solicitation to commit a crime constitutes an attempt: one approach treats every solicitation as a specific type of attempt to be governed by ordinary attempt principles. (2) naked solicitation is not an attempt but a solicitation accompanied by other overt acts. (3) in order to find the solicitor guilty of an attempt the other overt acts must proceed beyond what would be called preparation if the solicitor planned to commit the crime himself. (4) no matter what acts the solicitor commits, he cannot be guilty of an attempt because it is not his purpose to commit the offense personally.

Conspiracy – People v. Carter
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1982
Court: Supreme Court of Michigan
Conspiracy is defined as a partnership in criminal purposes, a mutual agreement of understanding, express of implied, between two or more persons to commit a criminal act or to accomplish a legal act by unlawful means.
The gist of the offense of conspiracy lies in the unlawful agreement. The crime is complete upon formation of the agreement.
Twofold specific intent is required for conviction: intent to combine with others, and intent to accomplish the illegal objective.
Conspiracy is a crime that is separate and distinct from the substantive crime that is its object. A conviction of conspiracy does not merge with a conviction of the completed offense.

Solicitation > Conspiracy > Attempt > Substantive crime
Solicitation is complete when the solicitation is made or advice is given with the specific wrongful intent to influence another or others to commit the offense. When the person solicited agrees, a conspiracy is formed. When an overt act is committed, conspiracy is complete. For attempt, the overt act required goes beyond preparatory steps and is a direct movement toward the commission of the offense.

Conspiracy - Pinkerton v. U.S.
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1946
Court: Supreme Court of the U.S.
2. Disposition: Affirm
3. Holding:
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: The jury found Walter guilty on nine substantive counts and on the conspiracy count and Daniel guilty on six substantive counts and on the conspiracy count.
6. Facts: Walter and Daniel Pinkerton were indicted for violations of the Internal Revenue Code.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: There is no evidence that Daniel participated directly in the commission of the substantive offenses. Each petitioner could be found guilty of the substantive offenses, if the petitioners were parties to an unlawful conspiracy and the substantive offenses charged were in fact committed in furtherance of it.
Continuous conspiracy -> There is no evidence of the affirmative action on the part of Daniel; so long as the partnership in crime continues the partners act for each other in carrying it forward.
Different if the substantive offense committed by one of the conspirators was not in fact done in furtherance of the conspiracy, did not fall within the scope of the unlawful project, or was merely a part of the ramifications of the plan which could not be reasonably foreseen as a necessary or natural consequence of the unlawful agreement.
Dissent: Walter alone committed the substantive crimes.

Mens rea - People v. Swain
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1996
Court: Supreme Court of California
2. Disposition: Reverse.
3. Holding: A conviction of conspiracy to commit murder requires a finding of intent to kill, and cannot be based on a theory of implied malice.
4. Issue: Where the target offense is determined to be murder in the second degree, does conviction of conspiracy to commit murder necessarily require proof of express malice or can one conspire to commit implied malice murder?
5. Procedural History: The jury returned a verdict finding Chatman guilty of second degree murder and conspiracy. The jury returned verdicts against Swain as not guilty of murder but guilty of conspiracy, where the target offense of the conspiracy was murder in the second degree.
6. Facts: A van passed and slowed down near the spot where Saileele and his friends were listening to music on the street. Several shots were fired from the front of the van. Chatman and another man fired guns from the rear of the van. Saileele died in surgery. Swain boasted to jailmates about what a good aim he had. Chatman admitted he had been in the van and stated that he fired only in self-defense.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: D contend the jury should have been instructed that proof of intent to kill is required to support a conviction of conspiracy to commit murder. That it was error to instruct on implied malice second degree murder in connection with the determination of whether they could be found guilty of conspiracy to commit murder, since implied malice does not require a finding of intent to kill.
The specific intent required divides into (a) the intent to agree, or conspire, and (b) the intent to commit the offense which is the object of the conspiracy. Proof of unlawful intent to kill is the functional equivalent of express malice.
Implied malice murder requires an intent to do some act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to human life; it is not necessary to establish that the defendant intended that his act would result in the death of a human being.

Conspiracy Mens Rea – People v. Lauria
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1967
Court: California Court of Appeal, Second District
2. Disposition:
3. Holding: Insufficient proof of Lauria’s participation in a criminal conspiracy.
4. Issue: When does a supplier become a part of a conspiracy to further an illegal enterprise by furnishing goods or services which he knows are to be used by the buyer for criminal purposes?
5. Procedural History:
6. Facts: Weeks, a policewoman, signed up with Lauria’s answering service and hinted that she was a prostitute concerned with the secrecy. Lauria assured Weeks. Weeks said she had been referred by Terry, one of the prostitutes under investigation and Lauria defended his business of taking messages. Lauria and the three prostitutes were arrested. Lauria stated he kept separate records for known or suspected prostitutes, but tolerated them as long as they pay their bills and knew Terry was a prostitute.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: People attempted to establish a conspiracy by showing that Lauria was well aware that the codefendants were prostitutes and continued to furnish them with service. -> equates knowledge of another’s criminal activity with conspiracy to further such criminal activity.
US. v. Falcone: absolved from a moonshining conspiracy. Knowledge of the illegal use of the goods was insufficient by itself for conspiracy. Direct v. U.S.: convicted of narcotics law for selling drugs. Conviction was affirmed because it actively promoted the sale. -> all articles do not have inherently the same susceptibility to harmful and illegal use.
Both the element of knowledge of the illegal use of the goods or services and the element of intent to further that use must be present in order to make the supplier a participant in a criminal conspiracy. Knowledge was established. Supplier who furnishes the equipment which he knows will be used to commit a serious crime may be deemed to have intended.
The intent may be established by: (1) direct evidence that he intends to participate, or (2) through an inference that he intends to participate based on (a) his special interest in the activity, or (b) the aggravated nature of the crime itself.

Conspiracy Actus reus - Commonwealth v. Azim
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1983
Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
2. Disposition:
3. Holding: Once conspiracy is established and upheld, a member of the conspiracy is also guilty of the criminal acts of his co-conspirators.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History:
6. Facts: Azim drove a car with two others as passengers. Azim called Tennenbaum, a Temple University student, over to the curb. The two passengers inflicted bodily injury to Tennenbaum and took his wallet. Azim drove the passengers away from the scene.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: Azim argues that because his conspiracy conviction was not supported, the charges of assault and robbery must also fail. -> no merit that Azim had no knowledge.

Commonwealth v. Cook
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1980
Court: Appeals Court of Massachusetts
2. Disposition: Reverse and remand.
3. Holding: The evidence of the confederation at the scene was insufficient to warrant D’s conviction of conspiracy.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: Cook was convicted on conspiracy to commit rape.
6. Facts: The victim went to Chicopee to visit friends and see her boyfriend. Her friends were not present and the victim passed by the area of the project office and Cook attempted to engage in conversation. The victim spurned the invitation and walked to the boyfriend’s residence. She intended to stay at her friends’ home and passed by the project office again. She accepted Cooks’ invitation to socialize and talked for 45 minutes. Cook suggested going to a convenience store to buy cigarettes and they went through a narrow path. The victim slipped and Cook jumped on her and raped her. The victim regained consciousness and the incident was reported to the police and the Cooks were arrested.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: It is essential to a conviction to prove the existence of an agreement and that Cook was aware of the objective of the conspiracy which was alleged. Proof may rest entirely or mainly on circumstantial evidence, but it cannot be left to surmise, conjecture, or guesswork.
The circumstances were not indicative of a preconceived plan between Cook and his bother to commit a sexual assault. They were consistent with a chance social encounter. Cook had nothing to do with the victim’s falling to the ground. Cook’s conduct was an accomplice adding encouragement to a crime in progress.
Can Cook be convicted of conspiracy solely on the evidence tending to show his complicity as an accomplice in the commission of the substantive crime? -> unjustified.
When D is convicted of conspiring, the conviction stems from the unlawful agreement preexisting commission. Proof of the conspiracy involves circumstantial evidence.

Scope of an Agreement - Kilgore v. State
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1983
Court: Supreme Court of Illinois
2. Disposition:
3. Holding: Kilgore and Oldaker and Benton were not co-conspirators and it was an error to admit the hearsay testimony of Oldaker.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: Kilgore was convicted for the murder and was given a life sentence.
6. Facts: Norman was traveling to his home in Alabama. While driving, Norman was shot in the head and killed by Kilgore. Oldaker testified that Benton asked him to go to Norman’s home to kill Norman from Carden’s request. Carden was brother-in-law of Norman. Oldaker and Benton went to Norman’s home but were unsuccessful in killing him. Williams testified that he saw two cars traveling close to each other and Norman was shot in the upper back. Chambers testified that Kilgore borrowed the Rambler and Kilgore stated that “we didn’t get him.” Chambers saw Kilgore state he need more money and retrieved fifteen thousand dollars. She saw Kilgore place a rifle in Price’s van; she heard Kilgore say we killed a man.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: Kilgore contends that the state did not prove he actually committed the murder and pursued conspiracy, but the state did not prove conspiracy because it did not prove the act occurred in Georgia. -> conspiracy was an evidentiary tool and the object of the conspiracy was completed.
Kilgore argues that admitting the hearsay testimony about Tom was an error. Admissible only when the out-of-court statements of one conspirator are admissible against all conspirators; in other words, only if Oldaker, Benton, and Kilgore were co-conspirators. -> they were not co-conspirators.
Mere tacit understanding to pursue an objective is enough to form a conspiracy.
Agreement is more likely to be inferred in chain conspiracies such as narcotics distribution.
It is more difficult to infer an agreement in wheel conspiracy where there is a hub of conspiracy.
There was no community of interests between Benton and Oldaker and Kilgore.

Accomplice liability imposes liability on one party for the actions of another.

State v. Ward
1. Case Heading:
2.
Parties:
Year: 1978
Court: Court of Appeals of Maryland
The CL divided guilty parties into principals and accessories. Principals are classified into the first degree (perpetrators) or in the second degree (abettors) and accessories as before the fact (inciters) and after the fact (criminal protectors).
Principal in the first degree actually commits a crime by own hand, an inanimate agency, or an innocent human agent.
Principal in the second degree is guilty of felony by reason of having aided, counseled, commanded or encouraged the commission thereof in his presence.
An accessory before the fact is guilty of felony by reason of having aided, counseled, commanded or encouraged the commission thereof without having been present either actually or constructively at the moment of perpetration.
An accessory after the fact is one who, with knowledge of the other’s guilt, renders assistance to a felon in the effort to hinder his detection, arrest, trial or punishment.
An accessory cannot be tried, without his consent, before the principal. An accessory could not be convicted of a higher crime than his principal.

Accessorial liability is not a distinct crime but a means by which a substantive crime may be committed; it makes one guilty not of aid and abetting but of the substantive offense committed by the perpetrator.

Accomplice Liability - State v. Hoselton
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1988
Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
2. Disposition: Reverse and set aside the conviction for entering without breaking.
3. Holding: Hoselton’s response that you could say he was a lookout does not establish that he was an aider and abettor. The State did not prove that he was a lookout.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: Hoselton was convicted of entering without breaking a vessel with intent to commit larceny.
6. Facts: Hoselton was charged as a principal in the first degree for breaking and entering or entering without breaking a storage unit on a docked barge with intent to commit larceny. The only evidence used to link him to the crime was his voluntary statement. The tools, charger, and other items stolen were resold but the profits were not given to Hoselton. Hoselton was unaware of his friends’ intent to steal and saw them stealing but did not assist them in placing the goods in the automobile.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: Hoselton contends that the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction for entering with intent to commit larceny.
State contends that Hoselton was a lookout and the conviction for breaking and entering as a principal in the first degree should stand. -> Lookouts are principals in the second degree but punishable as first degree.
A lookout is one who is by prearrangement, keeping watch to avoid interception or detection or to provide warning during the perpetration of the crimes and thereby participating in the offenses charged.

Offenses not requiring intent - Riley v. State
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 2002
Court: Court of Appeals of Alaska
2. Disposition: Affirm convictions for first-degree assault.
3. Holding:
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: The jury found Riley guilty as an accomplice in the wounding of both victims.
6. Facts: Riley and Portalla opened fire on an unsuspecting crowd around a bonfire. Two were seriously wounded. The State could not prove that the wound was inflicted by one of the two Ds.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: Jurors had to decide whether Riley acted as a principal or an accomplice.
Echols v. State: husband inflicted serious physical injury on the child and wife stood by and watched. The state argued wife could be an accomplice because (1) she solicited her husband to discipline and (2) she acted with the culpable mental state required for the crime. The court held that she had to act intentionally with respect to the prohibited result; her conscious objective was to have the child suffer injury. -> court misstated the law of complicity.
Riley: jury instruction failed to inform that the State was obliged to prove that Riley intended to have Portalla inflict serious physical injury.
What if the underlying offense is in terms of an unintended result? Under Echols, the State has to prove the guilt under a complicity theory and that they acted with the intent to kill.
Alaska complicity statute: accountable if the person (1) solicits that conduct, encourages the conduct, or assists in planning or performing the conduct and (2) the person acts with intent to promote or facilitate the commission of the offense. -> whenever the elements of an offense include a particular result, a person cannot be convicted as an accomplice to that offense unless they consciously intended to achieve that result.
Riley could be convicted because either upon proof that he personally shot a firearm or, acting with intent to promote or facilitate Portalla’s act of shooting, that he solicited, encouraged, or assisted Portalla to do so.
The applicable culpable mental state is recklessness as to the possibility that this conduct would cause serious physical injury.

Natural and Probable Consequences - State v. Linscott
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1987
Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
2. Disposition: Affirm.
3. Holding: We find no constitutional defect or any fundamental unfairness.
4. Issue: Does Linscott’s conviction subject to accomplice liability statute unconstitutionally violates his right to due process?
5. Procedural History: The trial court found Linscott guilty of robbery and, based on a theory of accomplice liability, of murder.
6. Facts: Linscott and two other men drove to Fuller’s house, where Fuller joined with a sawed-off shotgun, and to Ackley’s house, where Fuller obtained shells. Fuller suggested robbing Grenier, a reputed cocaine dealer. Fuller stated Grenier purchased two kilograms of cocaine and was seen with $50000 that day. Linscott and Fuller intended to break in the back door to prevent Grenier from reaching his shotgun, but the back door was blocked by snow, and the men broke in through the living room window. Fuller shot through the broken window that hit Grenier in the chest. Fuller robbed $1300 from Grenier’s pants and retrieved an empty shotgun casing.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: A rule allowing for a conviction under a theory of accomplice liability under an objective standard, despite the absence of culpable subjective mental state, is consistent with law.
The Court does not find unfair or disproportionate the grading scheme of murder on an accomplice liability.
Murder under a theory of accomplice liability based on an objective standard does not denote such punitive severity as to shock the conscience of the public, nor our own respective or collective sense of fairness.
-It is easier in common law than in MPC to convict Linscott of murder.

Actus Reus – State v. V.T.
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 2000
Court: Court of Appeals of Utah
2. Disposition: Reverse the conviction of the juvenile court.
3. Holding: No evidence was produced indicating VT had encouraged-much less that he solicited, requested, commanded, or intentionally aided-the other two boys in the theft of the camcorder.
4. Issue: Was there sufficient evidence to support the adjudication that he was an accomplice in the theft of the camcorder?
5. Procedural History: The juvenile court tried VT under an accomplice theory on the three theft charges. The court found that VT committed class A misdemeanor theft, but found insufficient evidence as an accomplice in the gun thefts.
6. Facts: VT, Moose, Joey went to a relative’s apartment to avoid being picked up by police for curfew violations. The relative found the boys gone, the door open, and two of her guns missing. The relative found them near her apartment complex and demanded to return her guns, but they refused, and the relative reported to the police. The relative found her camcorder missing and pawned at a shop. Inside the camcorder, Moose discussed pawning the stolen camcorder. VT was charged with two counts of theft of a firearm and one count of theft of camcorder.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: State alleges that VT’s continued presence during the theft and phone conversation and his friendship are enough evidence to support inference that he had encouraged the other two. Court: passive behavior absent affirmatively doing something is not enough to qualify as encouragement.

State v. Helmenstein
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1968
Court: Supreme Court of North Dakota
2. Disposition: Reverse.
3. Holding: Since all members are accomplices, there is no evidence connecting Helmenstein with the commission of the offense with which he is charged. Evidence is insufficient to sustain the judgment of conviction.
4. Issue: Was there competent evidence against the defendant sufficient to sustain the judgment of conviction?
5. Procedural History: The trial court found Helmenstein guilty.
6. Facts: Two groups of young people had been driving around. They met and drank beer. They got into defendant’s car. Someone suggested that they drive and break into the store. People suggested desire for articles from the store. They drove over and parked the car at some distance from the store. Three went to the store, broke in, and returned with goods. They drove back, divided loots, and separated. Five of the young people testified against Helmenstein. Henke testified that $130 worth of goods were taken.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: A conviction may not be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless his testimony is corroborated by such other evidence to connect the defendant with the offense. The corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense or the circumstances thereof.
If all of the members were accomplices, the evidence is insufficient to support D’s conviction.
Expressing desire for banana agreeing to burglary, participating in burglary, and helping with making up a story -> made them accomplices.

People v. Genoa
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1991
Court: Court of Appeals of Michigan
2. Disposition: Affirm the judgment.
3. Holding: The underlying crime was never committed by anyone.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History:
6. Facts: An undercover agent of the Police met with defendant and proposed that if Genoa gave the police $10000 the police would repay 13500 and a client list. The police turned the money over and Genoa was arrested.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: Prosecution: D attempted to aid and abet the crime of possession with intent to deliver cocaine. D was to help finance the proposed venture.
Elements that someone aided and abetted the commission of a crime: (1) the underlying crime was committed by either the defendant or some other person; (2) D performed acts or gave encouragement which aided and assisted the commission of the crime; and (3) D intended the commission of the crime or had knowledge that the principal intended its commission at the time of giving aid or encouragement.
Court: P must prove that the underlying crime was committed by someone and that D committed or aided and abetted the commission of that crime.
-Not 2.06 because principal is not present. Convicted under 5.01 of Genoa’s own crime.

Bailey v. Commonwealth
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1985
Court: Supreme Court of Virginia
2. Disposition:
3. Holding:
4. Issue: Is it proper to convict Bailey of involuntary manslaughter when he victim was killed by police officers responding to reports from Bailey concerning the victim’s conduct?
5. Procedural History:
6. Facts: The death of Murdock occurred after a conversation between Bailey and Murdock over their citizens’ band radios. The two cursed and threatened each other repeatedly. The two were intoxicated. Murdock had alcoholic content of .271% and was legally blind. Bailey knew that Murdock owned a handgun and would use it, that he was easily agitated, and that he idolized General Patton. Bailey demanded that Murdock arm himself and wait on his front porch and made phone calls to the police to report Murdock being on his porch. Three police officers went to Murdock’s house and saw Murdock come out with something shiny in his hand. Officer Chambers told Murdock to leave the gun and walk down but Murdock approached Chambers and opened fire. All three officers returned fire and Murdock was struck.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: Jury instruction- convict if Bailey’s negligence or reckless conduct was so gross and culpable as to indicate a callous disregard for human life and that his actions were the proximate cause or a concurring cause of Murdock’s death.
AG: Bailey was a principal in the first degree. Bailey: he was not the immediate perpetrator of crime. Court: one who effects a criminal act through an innocent or unwitting agent is a principal in the first degree.
Collins: Collins and undercover police were pursuing a common goal of soliciting for sexual favors. The accused was guilty because the fees were collected on his behalf. Bailey: he and police did not share common goal. Court: that is irrelevant.
The question is whether police officers were Bailey’s innocent or unwitting agent. Affirmative. Bailey: opening fire was an independent, intervening cause. Court: death was caused by Bailey’s conduct.