Civil Procedure - Cases, Text, Notes, and Problems (4th ed.) by Teply

Pennoyer v. Neff
1. Case Heading:
Parties: Individual (wants to reclaim the land) and individual (held land for eight years)
Year: 1878
Court: US Supreme Court
2. Disposition: Affirm the judgment.
3. Holding: The personal judgment recovered in the State court of Oregon against the plaintiff, a nonresident, was without any validity, and did not authorize a sale of the property in controversy.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: Circuit Court for the District of Oregon ruled in favor of Mitchell. Lower Federal Court held that judgment granting the ownership to defendant was invalid. Defendant appealed.
6. Facts: Neff claimed land under Oregon Dontions Act. Mitchell, Neff’s lawyer, sued Neff and received a default judgment for the representation fee in the form of the land. Mitchell transferred the land to Pennoyer and Pennoyer held the property for eight years. Neff reclaims the property.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning:

Wyman v. Newhouse
1. Case Heading:
Parties: Individual (fraudulently induced defendant to be in Fl) and individual (went to Fl)
Year: 1937
Court: Federal Appellate 2nd circuit
2. Disposition: Affirm the judgment of the district court.
3. Holding: An error made in entering judgment against a party over whom the court had no jurisdiction permits a consideration of the jurisdictional question collaterally.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: Federal district court for the Southern District of NY dismissed the complaint. Plaintiff appealed.
6. Facts: While Newhouse was in Salt Lake City, Utah, he received a telegram from Wyman that she had to see him. In NY, Newhouse received a letter and had a phone call where Wyman stated she is leaving to Ireland for her dying mother and had to talk to Newhouse before. Wyman sent a letter of affection to Newhouse. Newhouse arrived at Miami Airport and met Wyman and a deputy sheriff who served him process with a suit. Newhouse returned to NY and sought NY counsel, upon whose advice Newhouse ignored the summons and a default judgment was entered against him. Wyman sought an interview with Newhouse in NY.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning:the service of process was fraudulent. We apply the law of the forum where the service would have been set aside as fraudulent.

Harkness v. Hyde
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1878
Court: US Supreme Court
2. Disposition: Reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court of Idaho and the district court of Idaho and remand.
3. Holding:
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: The district court of Idaho jury awarded the plaintiff. Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed the judgment.
6. Facts: Hyde initiated the suit to recover damages for maliciously and without probable cause procuring the seizure and detention of property of the plaintiff under a writ of attachment. Harkness responded that his place, a reservation, was outside the jurisdiction.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning:

Milliken v. Meyer
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1940
Court: US Supreme Court
2. Disposition: Reverse the judgment of the Colorado Supreme Court.
3. Holding: The responsibilities of that citizenship arise out of the relationship to the state which domicile creates. That relationship is not dissolved by mere absence from the state.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History:Wyoming court found no joint venture or contract between Milliken and Transcontinental, but found them between Milliken and Meyer. The Colorado trial court found that the Wyoming decree was valid against Meyer. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the district court judgment.
6. Facts: Transcontinental paid Meyer 4/64th of profits in Colorado oil properties. Milliken asserted claim to 2/3 interest in that share. As a settlement, Transcontinental contracted to pay Milliken 2/64th interest and Milliken assigned his claims against Meyer to Transcontinental. Milliken instituted a suit in Wyoming charging Transcontinental and Meyer with a joint adventure and a conspiracy and sought cancellation of contract and an accounting. Meyer was served with a process in Colorado.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning:
-Meyer made no appearance without defense
-Meyer’s complaint that the Wyoming judgment be dismissed is to be dismissed.
-Wyoming

International Shoe Co. v. Washington
1. Case Heading:
Parties: Corporation (manufactures and sells shoes and footwear)
Year: 1945
Court: US Supreme Court
2. Disposition: Affirm the judgment of the Supreme Court of Washington.
3. Holding:
4. Issue: Is Shoe, a Delaware corporation, has by its activities in the State of Washington rendered itself amenable to proceedings in the courts of Washington?
5. Procedural History:Tribunal denied Shoe’s motion and the Superior Court and the Supreme Court affirmed
6. Facts: The statutes set up unemployment compensation partially contributed by employers. The assessment and collection of the contributions and the fund are administered by Washington. The notice of assessment was served upon a sales solicitor employed by Shoe in Washington, and a copy was mailed to the Shoe address in St. Louis, Missouri. Shoe specially appeared and moved to set aside the order and notice of assessment.
Shoe has no office, contracts, stock of merchandise, or deliveries of goods in Washington. However, regular and systematic solicitation of orders in Washington by Shoe salesmen resulted in continuous flow of Shoe product into the state, and product displays and salesmen’s domicile were held in the state.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: To the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of conducting activities within a state, it enjoys the benefits and protection of the laws of that state. The activities carried on in behalf of Shoe in Washington were neither irregular nor casual. They were systematic and continuous throughout the years in question.

McGee v. International
1. Case Heading: Parties: Individual (mother of deceased) v. Corporation, Year: 1957, Court: US Supreme Court
2. Disposition: Reverse the judgment and remand.
3. Holding:
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: CA state court ruled in favor of McGee in a default judgment and International was served with process through mail in Texas. Unable to collect, McGee sued in Texas. Texas courts refused to enforce the judgment, claiming service of process outside CA could not give that state courts proper jurisdiction.
6. Facts: In 1944, Franklin, a resident of CA, purchased a life insurance from the Empire Mutual Insurance Company, an Arizona Corporation. International assumed the insurance obligation in 1948 and mailed a reinsurance certificate to Franklin. Franklin accepted and paid premiums by mail to International’s Texas office until he died in 1950. McGee, Franklin’s mother and beneficiary, sent proofs of Franklin’s death to International but International refused to pay, claiming that Franklin had committed suicide. International never had an office, agent, or business in CA except for Franklin’s case.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: It is sufficient for purposes of due process that the suit was based on a contract which had substantial connection with that State.The contract was delivered in California, the premiums were mailed from there and the insured was a resident of that State when he died.
There may be inconvenience to the insurer if it is held amenable to suit in California where it had this contract but certainly nothing which amounts to a denial of due process. There is no contention that respondent did not have adequate notice of the suit or sufficient time to prepare its defenses and appear.

Hanson v. Denckla
1. Case Heading: Parties: , Year: 1958, Court: US Supreme Court
2. Disposition: Affirm the DE judgment.
3. Holding: The FL judgment was void because the FL courts did not have in rem and personal jurisdiction over the DE trustee.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: Denckla and Stewart sought a declaratory judgment from a FL court that the powers of appointment were testamentary and void because they did not have the necessary formalities. Hanson argued the court lacked personal jurisdiction and sought to dismiss. FL trial court held that it lacked personal jurisdiction but the powers of appointment were void. FL Supreme Court held that the court had personal jurisdiction and that the powers were void.
Hanson filed a suit in Delaware court to determine who was entitled to participate in the trust assets. DE trial court held that the trust and the powers were valid. Denckla and Stewart moved DE Supreme Court to remand based on the FL Supreme Court decision but the DE court rejected on the ground that the FL court did not have personal jurisdiction over Denckla and Stewart.
6. Facts: Donner, a PA resident, established a financial trust in 1935 and named Wilmington as trustee. The trust assets were to pass to whomever she specified, either by appointment or by will. Donner moved to FL in 1944, executed a will in 1949 and passed in 1952. Donnor executed two powers of appointment, for $200000 each, to two children of her daughter Hanson and let the remainder to her two other daughters through the residuary clause of her will.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: However minimal the burden of defending in a foreign tribunal, a defendant may not be called upon to do so unless he has had the minimal contacts with that State… we fail to find such contacts in the circumstances of this case.
From Florida, Donner carried on several bits of trust administration that may be compared to the mailing of premiums in McGee. But the record discloses no instance in which the trustee performed any acts in Florida that bear the same relationship to the agreement as the solicitation in McGee.
The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum State. It is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State.

Kulko v. Superior Court
1. Case Heading: Parties: , Year: 1978, Court: US Supreme Court
2. Disposition: Reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court of CA and remand.
3. Holding: CA could not assert jurisdiction over the father on the basis of acts he performed.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: The father specially appeared to challenge the jurisdiction of the CA trial court and the CA Supreme Court affirmed.
6. Facts: Kulkos divorced and entered into a separation agreement that provided that the two children would live with the father in NY during the school year and with mother in CA for other times and that the father would pay $3000/year in child support. The mother acquired a Haitian divorce, the children decided to live with the mother, and the father acquiesced. The mother sued in CA court to establish the Haitian as Californian, establish the custody, and increase the father’s support.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning:A father who agrees to allow the children to spend more time in CA then was required can hardly be said to have purposefully availed himself of the benefits and protections of CA’s laws.
While the presence of the children and one parent in CA might favor application of CA law in a lawsuit, the fact that CA may be the center of gravity for choice-of-law purposes does not mean that CA has personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
Appellant did not purposefully derive benefit from any activities relating to the State of CA, and it is apparent that the CA Supreme Court’s reliance on appellant’s having caused an effect in CA was misplaced.

Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz
1. Case Heading: Parties: , Year: 1985, Court: US Supreme Court
2. Disposition: Reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand.
3. Holding:
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: Burger King sued in S.D.F. invoking diversity jurisdiction. Rudzewicz specially appeared and argued that S.D.F. lacked jurisdiction, and the court denied the motion. The court ruled against Rudzewicz. Rudzewicz appealed and the Court of Appeals reversed, stating that S.D.F did not have personal jurisdiction over Rudzewicz.
6. Facts: Burger King has principal offices in Miami and outlets in 50 states and in foreign nations. Burger King conducts 80% of its business through a franchise operation, where it licenses trademarks and service marks, leases standardized facilities, gives proprietary information for operation, and various other assistances. Franchisees pay initial fee and monthly fees and conform to the regulation. The franchise relationship, encompassing payment and notices, is established in Miami and day-to-day monitoring of franchisees is done in 10 district offices. Rudzewicz and Macshara applied to Burger King franchise in Michigan in 1978. They entered into a preliminary agreement in 1979 and assumed operation of a facility. They purchased $165000 in equipment but had disagreements in fees and obligations. They signed the contract and were obligated to $1mil over the 20 year. They fell behind in monthly payments, the negotiations fell off, the headquarters terminated the franchise, and they continued to operate the franchise.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: The franchise dispute grew directly out of a contract which had a substantial connection with that State. Rudzewicz deliberately reached out beyond Michigan and negotiated with a Florida corporation… it was the Miami headquarters that made the key negotiating decisions…
Rudzewicz established a substantial and continuing relationship with Burger King’s Miami headquarters, received fair notice from the contract documents and the course of dealing…, and has failed to demonstrate how jurisdiction in that forum would otherwise be fundamentally be unfair.

World-Wide Vokswagen Corp. v. Woodson
1. Case Heading:
Parties: Corporation (distributes items in NY) and individual (injured in a car accident)
Year: 1980
Court: US Supreme Court
2. Disposition: Reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma.
3. Holding:
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: The Supreme Court of OK denied the writ, claiming its long-arm statute.
6. Facts: The Robinsons purchased a new Audi auto in NY in 1976. In 1977, the Robinsons left NY for AZ. As they drove in OK, another car struck the auto in the rear and caused a fire that severely burned Kay and two children. The Robinsons brought a products-liability action in OK claiming defective design and placement of the gas tank and fuel system.World-Wide specially appeared. The district court reject the plaintiff’s claim and denied the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. World-Wide sought a writ of prohibition to restrain the district judge Woodson from exercising in personam jurisdiction over them.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning:
Plaintiff argues: no auto sold by World-wide entered OK except for the one here.

Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court
1. Case Heading:
Parties: Corporation (manufacturer of tubes’ valve assembly based in Japan)
Year: 1987
Court: US Supreme Court
2. Disposition: Reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court of CA and remand.
3. Holding:
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: The Court of Appeal of CA issued a peremptory writ of mandate commanding the Superior Court to quash the service of summons. The Supreme Court of CA reversed and discharged the writ by the Court of Appeal.
6. Facts: In 1978, CA, Zurcher lost control of his Honda motorcycle and collided with a tractor. Zurcher was injured and his wife, Moreno, was killed. In 1979, Zurcher filed a product liability action against Cheng Shin. Zurcher alleged that the accident was caused by a sudden loss of air and an explosion in the rear tire. Cheng Shin filed a coss-complaint seeking indemnification from Asahi. Asahi moved to quash Cheng Shin’s service of summons. The Superior Court denied the motion to quash summons. Asahi knew some its products would end up in CA.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning:

J. McIntyre Mchinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 2011
Court: US Supreme Court
2. Disposition: Reverse the judgment of the NJ Supreme Court.
3. Holding:
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: NJ Supreme Court ruled that NJ can exercise jurisdiction over McIntyre.
6. Facts: Nicastro was seriously injured in his hand while using a metal-shearing machine manufactured by McIntyre. The accident occurred in NJ and the machine was manufactured in England.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning:
Plaintiff argued: McIntyre itself did not sell to buyers in the US beyond the US distributor, McIntyre officials attended conventions to advertise McIntyre that took place in the US but not in NJ, and one or more machine ended up n NJ.

Calder v. Jones
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1984
Court: U.S. Supreme Court
2. Disposition:
3. Holding: CA was the focal point for the article and the location of the harm, and the CA court has personal jurisdiction over Calder, et al.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History:
6. Facts: Jones filed a libel defamation action against the National Enquirer president Calder and others. The National Enquirer was headquartered in FL but distributed in CA. Calder had been to CA twice; once for pleasure and once to testify in another case.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: Effects test in upholding minimum contacts – (1) the defendants had committed an allegedly tortuous intentional act; (2) that act was expressly aimed at the forum state; and (3) the defendants knew that the brunt of the injury would be suffered by the plaintiff in the forum state.

Walden v. Fiore
1. Case Heading:
Parties: Individual (police officer in Georgia working in DEA) and individual (gambler whose money was forfeited)
Year: 2014
Court: U.S. Supreme Court
2. Disposition: Reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals; Nevada court does not have jurisdiction.
3. Holding: It is the defendant, not the plaintiff or third parties, who must create contacts with the forum state.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: The District Court granted Walden’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The US Court of Appeals reversed.
6. Facts: In 2006,TSA in San Juan searched and found $97000 from Fiore, on her way to Las Vegas through Atlanta. In Atlanta, DEA seized the cash and asked for a legitimate source for the cash. Walden submitted an affidavit on the probable cause for forfeiture of the funds to a US Attorney’s Office in GA. In 2007, the funds were returned to Fiore. Fiore filed suit against Walden in the US District Court for Nevada based on the 4th amendment claim.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning:

Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 2017
Court: U.S. Supreme Court
2. Disposition: Reverse the judgment of the CA Supreme Court.
3. Holding:
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: CA Superior Court denied the motion to quash the summons. CA Court of Appeals denied a writ of mandate from BMS. CA Supreme Court instructed to vacate the order denying mandate and that relief sought should not be granted. CA Court of Appeals, under Daimler, held that general jurisdiction was lacking but CA had specific jurisdiction over the claims against BMS. CA Supreme Court affirmed on general jurisdiction but was divided on specific j.
6. Facts: BMS is incorporated in DE, headquartered in NY, and substantially operates in NY and NJ. BMS also operates in CA. BMS did not develop, create a marketing strategy for, or did not manufacture, label package, or work on the regulatory approval of Plavix in CA. 86 CA residents and 592 residents from other states filed eight complaints in CA, alleging that Plavix had damaged their health. Residents alleged products liability, negligent misrepresentation, and misleading advertising claims. BMS moved to quash service of summons.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning:

Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 2021
Court: U.S. Supreme Court
2. Disposition: Affirm the judgments of Montana and Minnesota Supreme Courts.
3. Holding:
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: Montana and Minnesota Supreme Courts rejected Ford’s argument.
6. Facts: Ford is incorporated in DE and headquartered in MI, but engages in a wide range of activities throughout the states. Gullett was driving her Explorer in Montana when the tread separated from a rear tire. The vehicle spun out, rolled into a ditch, and came to rest upside down. Gullett died at the scene of the crash. The representative of her estate sued Ford in Montana state court. Bandemer was a passenger of Crown Victoria in Minnesota. The car rear-ended a snowplow and the car landed on a ditch, but the airbag failed to deploy and Bandemer suffered a brain damage.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning:
Ford’s claim is instead that those activities do not sufficiently connect to the suits, even though the resident-plaintiffs allege that Ford cars malfunctioned in the forum States. In Ford’s view, the needed link must be causal in nature: Jurisdiction attaches “only if the defendant’s forum conduct gave rise to the plaintiff’s claims.”
So there is a strong “relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation”—the “essential foundation” of specific jurisdiction.
Ford moved to dismiss the two suits for lack of personal jurisdiction, on basically identical grounds. According to Ford, the state court (whether in Montana or Minnesota) had jurisdiction only if the company’s conduct in the State had given rise to the plaintiff’s claims. And that causal link existed, Ford continued, only if the company had designed, manufactured, or—most likely—sold in the State the particular vehicle involved in the accident. Only later resales and relocations by consumers had brought the vehicles to Montana and Minnesota.
In BMS, plaintiffs were suing in California because it was thought plaintiff-friendly, even though their cases had no tie to the State. That is not at all true of the cases before us. Yes, Ford sold the specific products in other States, as Bristol-Myers Squibb had. But here, the plaintiffs are residents of the forum States. They used the allegedly defective products in the forum States. And they suffered injuries when those products malfunctioned in the forum States.

Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.
1. Case Heading:
Parties: Individual and corporation (mining corporation operating in the Philippines
Year: 1952
Court:
2. Disposition:
3. Holding: Benguet had a continuous and systematic activities in Ohio and the high level of activity gave jurisdiction, even though the claim did not arise out of the activities.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: Perkins sued Benguet in Ohio.
6. Facts: Benguet failed to issue certain shares of stock to Perkins and Perkins sued to recover damages. Benguet president lived and conducted the activities of the corporation in Ohio during the suspension of the mining activities.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning:

Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1984
Court:
2. Disposition:
3. Holding: Mere purchases, even if occurring at regular intervals, are not enough to warrant a state’s assertion of general jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation in a cause of action not related to those purchase transactions.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History:
6. Facts: Helicopteros purchased over $4 million worth of helicopers and parts.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning:

Goodyear Dunlap Tire Operations, S.A. v. Brown
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 2011
Court: U.S. Supreme Court
2. Disposition: Reverse the N.C. judgment.
3. Holding: in the same way that purchases in the forum state are insufficient to support the exercise of general jurisdiction, sales in the forum state of a foreign defendant’s products, when the plaintiff’s claim does not arise out of or relate to those product sales, are similarly insufficient.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: N.C. Court of Appeals saw that the claims did not relate to nor arose from Goodyear’s contacts with N.C. and upheld general jurisdiction because Goodyear placed tires in the stream of interstate commerce without any limitation on the extent to which those tires could be sold.
6. Facts: Brown allege Goodyear manufactured a defective tire that caused a bus accident in Paris. Two boys died and their parents sued Goodyear in N.C. N.C. courts upheld general jurisdiction over Goodyear based on the distribution and sale in N.C. of other tires.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning:a court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign corporations when their affiliations with the state are so continuous and systematic as to be essentially at home in the state.

Daimler AG v. Bauman
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 2014
Court: US Supreme Court
2. Disposition: Reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
3. Holding:
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: Daimler filed a motion to dismiss the claims based on lack of personal jurisdiction. The district court granted the motion. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed and later reversed.
6. Facts: Bauman, et al., residents of Argentina, brought suit against Daimler in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs alleged that Mercedes-Benz Argentina (MBA), a Daimler subsidiary, collaborated with Argentinian forces to kidnap, torture, and kill MBA workers during an Argentinian war. These workers were the plaintiffs or persons closely related to the plaintiffs. Daimler was a German company. MBA’s alleged actions took part solely outside of the United States. The plaintiffs based their claim of the district court’s jurisdiction on Daimler’s subsidiary, Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (MBUSA), which was incorporated in Delaware and had its principal place of business in New Jersey. MBUSA distributed Daimler cars to all 50 states and had various facilities and offices in California.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning:

Shaffer v. Heitner
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1977
Court: US Supreme Court
2. Disposition: Reverse the judgment of the Delaware Supreme Court
3. Holding:
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History:
6. Facts: Heitner (plaintiff) brought a shareholder derivative suit in Delaware against the Greyhound Corporation, incorporated in Delaware, represented by Shaffer, alleging acts that took place in Oregon. Heitner also filed a motion for an order of sequestration of shares of Greyhound stock owned by the individual defendants named in the complaint, who move to vacate the sequestration order on the grounds that the ex parte sequestration violated their due process rights and that the property seized was not capable of attachment in Delaware. The court rejected this challenge on the ground that the suit was brought as a quasi in rem proceeding, which is traditionally based on seizure of property present in the jurisdiction rather than contacts between the defendant and the state.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning:

Burnham v. Superior Court
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1990
Court: US Supreme Court
2. Disposition: Affirm the judgment
3. Holding:
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: Dennis filed a motion to quash on the basis that it was a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for California to assert jurisdiction over him, because he lacked the minimum contacts necessary for personal jurisdiction. The superior court denied the motion, and the California Court of Appeal denied mandamus relief, holding that it was enough that Dennis was present in the forum and personally served with process. Dennis appealed.
6. Facts: Dennis Burnham (plaintiff) and Francie Burnham were married from 1976 until July 1987, at which point they decided to separate. At that time, they were living in New Jersey with their two children. They agreed to divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences and that Francie would move to California, where she would have custody of both children. She moved to California, and in October 1987, Dennis filed for divorce in the state of New Jersey on the grounds of desertion, but never attempted to serve her. In January 1988, while in California for business and to visit his children, Dennis was served with a California court summons and Francie’s divorce petition. Subsequently, he returned to New Jersey.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning:

Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1950
Court: US Supreme Court
2. Disposition:
3. Holding: The notice by publication violated due process as to beneficiaries whose identities and location were known but not to those whose identities and location were not known. The notice must be “reasonably calculated” to satisfy due process.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History:
6. Facts: New York enacted “common trust fund” legislation that permitted small trust estates to pool their assets in a single fund. For such a fund, periodic judicial accounting proceedings were required. The statute provided that the resulting judicial decree was binding and conclusive on all… The only notice of the judicial accounting required was by publication. Central established such a common trust fund and filed for a judicial accounting. Notice of the accounting was given to all beneficiaries, by publication in a local New York newspaper. The specially appointed guardian and attorney for the beneficiaries challenged the adequacy of this notice by publication as a violation of due process.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning:

Jones v. Flowers
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 2006
Court: US Supreme Court
2. Disposition: Reverse the judgment of the AK Supreme Court.
3. Holding:
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Flowers, which was affirmed by the Arkansas Supreme Court.
6. Facts: Jones purchased and lived in the house in AK until they separated. Jones moved to an apartment. Jones paid the mortgage but the property taxes went unpaid. The Commissioner of State Lands sent a letter via certified mail to Jones’ address, informing him of his delinquency and that he had two years to pay his back taxes or the property would be sold. No one was home or at the post office. The letter was returned “unclaimed.” Wilcox published a notice of public sale in the Arkansas Democrat Gazette. The advertisement did not receive a response, so a private sale of the property was arranged with Linda Flowers. Prior to the completion of the sale, Wilcox sent another letter to Jones, which was also returned as “unclaimed.” Flowers then purchased the house and personally served a detainer notice on the property, which was accepted by Jones’ daughter. Jones was notified and sued in Arkansas state court, arguing that the form of service employed by Wilcox was a constitutionally inadequate form of notice.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning:

Pfeiffer v. Insty Prints
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1993
Court: US District Court, Northern District of Illinois
2. Disposition:
3. Holding: Transfer the case to the Eastern District of Wisconsin.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History:
6. Facts: Pfeiffer is an Illinois resident and contracted with Performing Arts Center of Milwaukee to perform a play. MCWM is incorporated in Wisconsin and has business in Milwaukee, WI. Ahern, a Wisconsin resident, was to oversee the production and supervise the theater. Pfeiffer also contracted with Insty Prints, a Minnesota corporation, for tickets. Pfeiffer argues that the theater and the tickets were not properly supervised, tickets were not properly mailed, advertisements were not proper, and Pfeiffer was not informed. Insty argues the Northern District of Illinois is not a proper venue but the Eastern District of Wisconsin is proper.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning:

Bates v. C&S Adjusters, Inc.
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1992
Court: US Court of Appeals, 2nd circuit
2. Disposition: Reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand.
3. Holding: The trial in the Western District of NY is fair.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: C&S filed a motion to dismiss for improper venue and the District Court granted it.
6. Facts: Bates incurred the debt while he was a resident of the Western District of Pennsylvania. The creditor referred the account to C&S that has no business in New York. Bates moved to the Western District of New York. C&S mailed a collection notice to Bates at his PA address and it was forwarded to his NY address.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning:

Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1981
Court: US Supreme Court
2. Disposition: Reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
3. Holding: No, the possibility of an unfavorable change in the law should not, by itself, bar dismissal.
4. Issue: Does the possibility of an unfavorable change of the law in plaintiff’s home forum bar dismissal under forum non convenient (Transfer to a More Convenient Forum)?
5. Procedural History: Reyno sued Piper and Hartzell in the Superior Court of CA. The suit was removed to US District Court for the Central District of CA. Piper moved to transfer to US District Court for the Middle District of PA. Hartzell moved to dismiss and the District Court transferred the case to the M.D.PA. Petitioners moved to dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens. The District Court granted the motion. The Court of Appeals reversed.
6. Facts: The Respondent’s decedents died in an aircraft in the Scottish Highlands. All the decedents were Scottish residents, as were their heirs. As the decedents' personal representative, respondent filed suit against petitioner in the United States because petitioner manufactured the aircraft in Pennsylvania and the law was more favorable to their case. Petitioner wanted to litigate the tort action in Scotland. A district court dismissed the action, but the lower appellate court reversed the district court's decision.
7. Rule: Dismissal on grounds of forum non conveniens may be granted even though the law applicable in the alternative forum is less favorable to the plaintiff's chance of recovery. The possibility of an unfavorable change of law should not, by itself, bar dismissal.
8. Reasoning: The possibility of an unfavorable change in the law in Scotland should not, by itself, bar dismissal. The court held that plaintiffs may not defeat a motion to dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens merely by showing that the substantive law that would be applied in the alternative forum is less favorable to the plaintiffs than that of the chosen forum, since the possibility of a change in substantive law should ordinarily not be given conclusive or even substantial weight in the forum non conveniens inquiry. In this case the proper forum was Scotland given that fewer evidentiary problems would be posed if the trial were held in Scotland; the inability to implead potential third party defendants clearly supported holding the trial in Scotland; and public interest favored trial in Scotland, the accident having occurred in its air space, all the decedents being Scottish, and apart from the manufacturers, all potential plaintiffs and defendants being either Scottish or English.

The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1972
Court: US Supreme Court
2. Disposition: Reverse and remand.
3. Holding: As a matter of federal law, a forum-selection clause in a freely negotiated, commercial contract between sophisticated business parties was prima facie valid and enforceable.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: The federal district court and the appellate court refused the request to enforce the forum-selection clause.
6. Facts: A German tug owner contracted with an American company to tow the American’s rig from LA to Italy. German company inserted a forum-selection clause, treating dispute in London. A severe storm damaged American’s rig in the Gulf of Mexico. American filed suit in FL federal district court.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning:

Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1991
Court: US Supreme Court
2. Disposition: Reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
3. Holding:
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: The district court dismissed the action. The court of appeals reversed.
6. Facts: Shutes purchased passage for a 7-day cruise on Tropicale through a Washington travel agent. Shute paid the agent who forwarded the payment to Carnival headquarters in Miami. Carnival prepared and sent tickets to Shute in Washington, including forum-selection clause that chose FL. Tropicale sailed from Los Angeles to Puerto Vallarta, Mexico and returned. Off the Mexican coast, Shute slipped on a deck mat during a guided tour of the ship’s galley and was injured. Shute filed suit in US District Court for the Western District of Washington, claiming negligence. Carnival moved for summary judgment, citing the forum clause.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning:

Atlantic Marine Construction Co. v. US District Court
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 2013
Court: US Supreme Court
2. Disposition: Reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
3. Holding:
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: The district court denied both motions. The Court of Appeals denied Atlantic’s petition.
6. Facts: Atlantic entered into a contract with the Army Corps of Engineers to construct a child-development center at Fort Hood. Atlantic entered into a subcontract with J-Crew. The subcontract included a forum-selection clause, choosing Norfolk, VA as the forum. After a dispute about payment, J-Crew sued Atlantic in the Western District of Texas, invoking diversity jurisdiction. Atlantic moved to dismiss, citing the forum-selection clause, and moved to transfer to VA.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning:

Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Mottley
1. Case Heading:
Parties: Individual (injured in tort involving rail) and corporation (operator of rail and issuer of free passes)
Year: 1908
Court: US Supreme Court
2. Disposition: Reverse the judgment and remit to dismiss the suit for want of jurisdiction.
3. Holding: The issues are irrelevant because the court lacked jurisdiction of the cause.
4. Issue: (1) whether that part of the Act of Congress that forbids the giving of free passes or the collection of any different compensation for transportation of passengers that that specified makes it unlawful to perform a contract before the passage of the act. (2) whether the statute, if it makes the contract unlawful, is in violation of the 5th amendment.
5. Procedural History: Mottley sued in equity court of the WD of Kentucky. Railroad demurred, the Circuit Court overruled the demurrer and ruled in favor of Mottley, and Railroad appealed.
6. Facts: Mottley went into a contract with Railroad in 1871 that released all claims and damages for injuries received by Mottley by granting them free passes. The contract was performed until 1907 when the pass was not renewed, based on the argument that the Act of Congress forbid giving of free passes.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: Application of Metcalf v. City of Watertown is decisive against the jurisdiction of the court.

Grable & Son’s Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Manufacturing
1. Case Heading:
Parties: Corporation (lost real property for tax delinquency) and corporation (claimed the real property).
Year: 2005
Court: US Supreme Court
2. Disposition: Affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
3. Holding: National interest in providing a federal forum for federal tax litigation is sufficiently substantial to support the exercise of federal question jurisdiction over the disputed issue on removal.
4. Issue: whether want of a federal cause of action to try claims of title to land obtained at a federal tax sale precludes removal to federal court of a state action with nondiverse parties raising a disputed issue of federal title law.
5. Procedural History: The District Court declined to remand the case at Grable’s behest, and gave summary judgment to Darue. The Court of Appeals of the 6th circuit affirmed.
6. Facts: In 1994, the IRS seized Michigan real property belonging to Grable to satisfy his federal tax delinquency. Grable received actual notice by certified mail before the sale of the property to Darue. Grable received the notice of sale but did not exercise its right to redeem the property within 180 days of the sale. The Government gave Darue a quitclaim deed. In 1999, Grable brought a quiet title action, claiming that Darue’s record title was invalid because the IRS failed to notify Grable according to 6335(a). Darue removed the case to Federal District Court, claiming that the claim depended on the statute in the federal tax law.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning:

Gunn v. Minton
1. Case Heading:
Parties: Individual (inventor of TEXCEN) and individual (lawyer for Minton)
Year: 2013
Court: US Supreme Court
2. Disposition: Reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court of Texas.
3. Holding:
4. Issue: Whether a state law claim alleging legal malpractice in the handling of a patent case must be brought in federal court.
5. Procedural History: The trial court granted summary judgment to Gunn, holding that there is no evidence that the lease was for an experimental purpose. Minton appealed, arguing that the malpractice claim was based on an error in a patent case and arises under federal patent law, and the Texas court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. The Supreme Court of Texas reversed, holding that Minton’s claim involved a substantial federal issue.
6. Facts: Minton developed a computer program and telecommunications network to facilitate securities trading. In 1995, he leased the system, called TEXCEN, to Stark, a securities brokerage. In 1996, Minton applied and received a patent for a trading system based on TEXCEN. Minton filed a patent infringement suit in Federal District Court against NASD and NASDAQ with Gunn representing Minton. Defendants moved for summary judgment, claiming “on sale” bar that a patent is invalid if the invention was on sale more than one year prior to the application. The District Court granted the motion and declared the patent invalid. Minton filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the lease with Stark was an ongoing testing and fell within the “experimental use” exception to the on-sale bar. Minton appealed and the court of appeals affirmed. Minton sued Gunn for failing to raise the experimental-use argument.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning:

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc.
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 2005
Court: US Supreme Court
2. Disposition: Affirm the judgment of the 11th circuit and reverse that of the 1st circuit.
3. Holding: Where the other elements of jurisdiction are present and at least one named plaintiff satisfies the amount, 1367 authorizes supplemental jurisdiction over the claims of other plaintiffs in the same Art III case.
4. Issue: Can a federal court in a diversity action exercise supplemental jurisdiction over additional plaintiffs whose claims do not satisfy the minimum amount requirement provided the claims are part of the same case?
5. Procedural History:
6. Facts: 10000 Exxon dealers filed a class action against Exxon in the USDC for NDFl, alleging intentional and systematic scheme by Exxon to overcharge for fuel. The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiffs. The District Court certified the case for review.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: 11th circuit: 1367 clearly and unambiguously provides district courts with the authority in diversity class actions to exrcise supplemental jurisdiction over the claims of class members who do not meet the minimum as long as the district court has original jurisdiction over the claims of at least one of the class representatives.
1st circuit: 1367 authorizes supplemental jurisdiction only when the district court has original jurisdiction over the action, and in a diversity case original jurisdiction is lacking if one plaintiff fails to satisfy the amount requirement.
When the well-pleaded complaint contains at least one claim that satisfies the amount requirement, and there are no other relevant jurisdictional defects, the district court has original jurisdiction over that claim. The presence of other claims is of no moment.

Conley v. Gibson
1. Case Heading:
Parties: (African-American railroad employees) and (union)
Year: 1957
Court: US Supreme Court
2. Disposition:
3. Holding:
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History:
6. Facts: A contract between the Union and the Railroad gave the employees certain protection from discharge and loss of seniority. Railroad purported to abolish 45 jobs that resulted in discharge or demotion of the African-American employees, but the jobs were given to white employees. Plaintiff filed class action in federal district court, alleging that the Union did nothing to protect them despite repeated pleas and discriminated in violation of the Railway Labor Act. Union alleged the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning:

Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit
1. Case Heading:
Parties: (homeowner) and (employer of police officers)
Year: 1993
Court: US Supreme Court
2. Disposition: Reverse the judgment of the 5th circuit.
3. Holding:
4. Issue: Can a federal court apply a heightened pleading standard, more stringent than the usual Rule8(a), in civil rights cases alleging municipal liability under 42 USC §1983?
5. Procedural History: USDC for ND of Texas dismissed the complaint, stating that the heightened pleading standard required by the decision of the 5th circuit was not met. The 5th circuit affirmed.
6. Facts: In execution of search warrants, local law enforcement officers forcibly entered homes based on the detection of odors associated with the manufacture of narcotics. One homeowner claims he was assaulted and another claims her two dogs were killed. Homeowners allege the 4th amendment was violated. The municipal liability was the failure to adequately train the police officers.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning:

Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.
1. Case Heading:
Parties: (employee) and (reinsurance company)
Year: 2002
Court: US Supreme Court
2. Disposition: Reverse the judgment of the 2nd circuit.
3. Holding: An employment discrimination complaint need not include such facts and must contain only a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.
4. Issue: Should a complaint in an employment discrimination lawsuit contain specific facts establishing a prima facie case of discrimination under the framework set forth?
5. Procedural History: USDC for SD of NY dismissed the complaint because S did not adequately alleged a prima facie case, in that he had not adequately alleged circumstances that support an inference of discrimination. The 2nd circuit affirmed.
6. Facts: S, a native of Hungary, worked at a French firm Sorema for 6 years when he was demoted and his underwriting responsibilities transferred to a young French national. S alleges he was isolated, excluded from business decisions and meetings, and denied the opportunity to reach his true potential. S expressed his grievances and requested a severance package, but he was fired after refusing to resign. S sues that he was terminated in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 USC §2000, and ADEA.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning:

Bell Atlantic Corp v. Twombly
1. Case Heading:
Parties: (ILECs, a system of regional service monopolies) and (subscribers of local telephone and/or high speed internet)
Year: 2007
Court: US Supreme Court
2. Disposition: Reverse the judgment of the 2nd circuit.
3. Holding:
4. Issue: Can §1 of the Sherman Act complaint survive a motion to dismiss when it alleges that major telecommunications providers engaged in certain parallel conduct unfavorable to competition?
5. Procedural History: The USDC for the SD of NY dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Court of Appeals for the 2nd circuit reversed, holding that plus factors are not required to be pleaded to permit an antitrust claim based on parallel conduct to survive dismissal.
6. Facts: Twombly seek treble damages and declaratory and injunctive relief for the violations of §1 of the Sherman Act. Twombly alleges ILECs conspired to restrain trade, inflating charges for the services, by eneaging in parallel conduct to inhibit the growth of CLECs and agreeing to refrain from competing against one another.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning:

Ashcroft v. Iqbal
1. Case Heading:
Parties: (federal officials) and (a person in federal custody)
Year: 2009
Court: US Supreme Court
2. Disposition: Reverse the judgment of the 2nd circuit.
3. Holding:
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: The district court denied the motion to dismiss. 2nd circuit affirmed.
6. Facts: After 9/11, Iqbal, a citizen of Pakistan, was arrested on criminal charges for fraud related to identification documents and conspiracy to defraud the US. He plead guilty and was deported. He sued, claiming he was deprived of constitutional protections while in federal custody, with the substantive claims based on Bivens actions. Iqbal alleges federal officials adopted an unconstitutional policy that subjected Iqbal to harsh conditions of confinement on account of his race, religion, or national origin.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning:

Hill v. Equitable Bank, N.A.
1. Case Heading:
Parties: (investors in the partnerships)
Year: 1985
Court: USDC Delaware
2. Disposition:
3. Holding:
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History:
6. Facts: Hill alleges Equitable participated in an alleged scheme to defraud Hill in relation to the sale of interests in two limited partnerships. Hill cited Securities Act of 1933, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the common law of Maryland and Delaware, and amends to assert RICO charge. The district court set June 14, 1985, as the cut-off date for amending the pleadings, but Hill filed a motion to amend on Sept 10, 1985.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning:

Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A.
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 2010
Court: US Supreme Court
2. Disposition: Reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
3. Holding:
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: The district court denied Cruise’s motion for summary judgment without prejudice and granted Krupski leave to amend. Krupski amended and served Crociere. The District Court dismissed Cruise. Crociere moved to dismiss, contending that the amended complaint did not relate back under 15(c) and was untimely, and the district court agreed, stating that Krupski knew of the proper defendant. The 11th circuit affirmed.
6. Facts: Krupski tripped over a cable and fractured her femur on board the cruise ship Costa Magica. Krupski’s passenger ticket explained that it was the sole contract. Krupski’s counsel notified Costa Cruise Lines of the claims. The parties were unable to settle and Krupski sued, three weeks before the 1-year limitation, Costa Cruise. Over the next three months, Costa Cruise brought Costa Crociere’s existence to Krupski’s attention three times. It filed an answer, asserting that it was not the proper defendant but merely agent; it listed Crociere as an interested party in its corporate disclosure statement; and it moved for summary judgment, stating Crociere as the proper defendant. Krupski responded by arguing for limited discovery to determine whether Cruise should be dismissed. Krupski gave information that led her to believe Cruise was responsible and amended her complaint to add Crociere as a defendant.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning:

Schrag v. Dinges
1. Case Heading:
Parties: (operated with an option to purchase) and (complex owner who used financial machinations)
Year: 1993
Court: USDC District of Kansas
3. Holding: Plaintiffs do not have the right to bring RICO charge and summary judgments are granted to Youngers, Shaffer, and Simpson. Give plaintiffs 30 days to show cause why the court’s real party in interest analysis should not apply to Dinges.
4. Issue:
6. Facts: Schrag allege Dinges and others were involved in four separate fraudulent schemes concerning development of a real estate investment firm Rexmoor Properties and brought a RICO charge. Count I alleges that Dinges owned a country club through Paganica and Schwartz and Meier operated at the complex through S&M with an option to purchase. An EPA order brought Paganica close to bankruptcy and Dinges and Ewing transferred Paganica’s assets to Rexmoor, refinanced, and used various financial machinations involving fraudulent loans and encumberences.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: Schwartz and Meier argue they were parties to the Management Agreement and shareholders in S&M and Dinges breached a special duty to them. Court: the agreement gave option to sell S&M stock to Paganica but not rights respecting the option to purchase the Paganica property. They do not claim that their losses were distinct from those of the other S&M shareholders. -> they are not the proper parties to assert the RICO claim set forth in CountI.
Rule 17(a) provides that dismissal of a claim not brought in the name of the real party in interest is proper only after a reasonable time for substitution or ratification.

Joseph Muller Corp. Zurich v. Societe Anonyme de Gerance et D’Amement
1. Case Heading:
Parties: (Switzerland corporation) and (corporation in France)
Year: 1970
Court: USDC SDNY
3. Holding: Both parties have been granted by the laws under which they are organized the capacity to sue or be sued, and the limitations by the treaty do not incapacitate Muller or the court’s SMJ. Deny Societe’s motion to dismiss.
4. Issue:
6. Facts: Muller claims Societe breached a written charter party agreement to ship vinyl chloride monomer from the US to Europe; that Societe monopolized the transportation of CM and conspired to fix the charges. Societe alleges that the Swiss laws under which Muller was organized prohibit it from suing Societe anywhere except in France. Specifically, Convention in 1869 stipulates that in all disputes the action to take in the courts of the nation of the defendant.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: Capacity to sue or be sued under Rule 17 mean the general capacity to sue or be sued. Rules look to the laws under which a corporation is organized to determine if a corporation has been granted this general capacity.

Rainbow Management Group, Ltd. v. Atlantis Submarines Hawaii, L.P.
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1994
Court: USDC District of Hawaii
3. Holding: Atlantis’s initial crossclaim included a claim for contribution and indemnity and breach of contract. RMG was on notice that it would have to defend against claims other than its original one. Grant Atlantis’s motion for summary judgment.
4. Issue:
6. Facts: RMG’s vessel Elua was ferrying passengers to Atlantis’s submarine Atlantis X. The two vessels were tied together and a ramp placed between them. Boston Whaler was moored and preparing passengers for scuba dive. Elua collided with the Boston Whaler, destroying Boston and damaging Elua. In 1983, Passengers of Boston sued RMG and Atlantis for negligence. Atlantis asserted crossclaim against RMG for indemnity. RMG asserted crossclaim against Atlantis but did not join a claim against Atlantis for damage to Elua. RMG served a third-party complaint on Haydu.
In 1994, RMG seeks recovery against Atlantis for damages to Elua’s hull and the loss of use. Atlantis asserts RMG’s claim is a compulsory counterclaim that should have been asserted in a previous lawsuit. RMG moved to consolidate the suit with the pending Berry case, months after the deadline for amended pleadings set by the Rule 16, but the judge denied motion because of delay and prejudice to the opposing parties.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: Atlantis argues that RMG’s claims are compulsory counterclaims and RMG was an opposing party under Rule 13(a). RMG argues that its Elua claim is a permissive crossclaim from Rule 13(g). Atlantis was a co-party in the Berry case and the claim was not required.

Tenneco Oil Co. v. Templin
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1991
Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
2. Disposition: Reverse the judgment of the trial court.
3. Holding: Tenneco’s contribution action was not barred.
4. Issue: Is a claim by a defendant in a tort action against a plaintiff for contribution for damages awarded in favor of a co-plaintiff a compulsory counterclaim, so that the defendant is barred by res judicata from pursing the claim for contribution in a separate action after judgment has been rendered. Is a claim by a defendant in a tort action against a co-defendant for contribution barred by res judicata if it was not brought as a crossclaim in the original action.
5. Procedural History: The trial court granted summary judgment to Templin and Bullman and denied Tenneco’s motion for summary judgment.
6. Facts: Bullman sued Tenneco, Tenneco employee, Templin, and others in a multi-car collision. Templin filed a counterclaim against Bullman. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Bullman and awarded $400000 to wife and none to Mr. Bullman; in favor of Templin on counterclaim for contribution. Tenneco satisfied one-half of this judgment and Templin and Mr. Bull man one-fourth. Tenneco filed a contribution claim against Templin and Bullman, arguing that because all three were joint tortfeasors, all three should bear a pro rata share of the total judgment.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: Bullman argues the claim against it is barred because it was a compulsory counterclaim in the tort action. A compulsory counterclaim is one which 1) arises out of the same transaction or occurrence as the main claim and 2) has matured at the time the answer is filed.
Court: Tenneco’s claim for contribution arose out of the same transaction as Bullman’s claim against Tenneco. Whether the claim for contribution existed at the time Tenneco’s answer in the tort action was served is complicated.
Templin argues the claim against it is barred because it could have been raised in the tort action as a crossclaim. The language is permissive and in no way makes a crossclaim arising out of the same transaction… compulsory.

Swift v. Tyson
1. Case Heading:
Parties: (claims to be a bona fide purchaser) and (refused to pay for the bill)
Year: 1842
Court: US Supreme Court
2. Disposition:
3. Holding: The federal courts had a right to make a judgment on the content of the general commercial law that was independent of what the state courts might hold the content of that law to be.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: At the federal court in New York, Tyson made fraud defense and Swift claimed he was a bona fide purchaser for value.
6. Facts: Norton and Keith purported to convey land in Maine to Tyson in return for Tyson accepting bill of exchange. Tyson agreed to pay $1540 to Norton six months later. Norton endorsed the bill to Swift before the bill was due for payment and Swift canceled a preexisting debt owed to him by Norton. When Swift presented the bill for payment to Tyson, Tyson refused to pay.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: Under prevailing conflict of laws rules, the law of the place where the bill of exchange was accepted (ME) was regarded as governing the transaction. The conflict of laws rule governing contacts provided that the law of the place where the contract was made (NY) governed the scope and validity of the contract.

Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins
1. Case Heading:
Parties: (freight operator that invoked PA law to state D was a trespasser) and (injured by freight)
Year: 1938
Court: US Supreme Court
2. Disposition: Reverse the judgment and remand.
3. Holding:
4. Issue: Should the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson be disapproved?
5. Procedural History: The jury awarded $30000 to Tompkins and the Appeals court affirmed.
6. Facts: Tompkins, a citizen of PA, was injured in PA by a passing freight train of the Erie while walking along its right of way. Tompkins claims he was on a commonly used beaten footpath alongside the tracks when he was struck by a projection from one of the moving cars. Tompkins brought an action in the federal court of SDNY where Erie is a corporation. Erie claims that the PA law should determine the case.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: Erie contends that the PA rule should be applied by section 34 of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789.

Van Dusen v. Barrack
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1964
Court: US Supreme Court
2. Disposition:
3. Holding: When a transfer of venue under 1404(a) is made on the defendant’s motion, the transferee district court must apply the conflict-of-laws rules of the transferor state in determining which state’s substantive law should be applied in the case.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History:
6. Facts:
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: The transferee court must attempt to duplicate the substantive legal result that would have been reached in the transferor state.

Ferens v. John Deere Co.
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1990
Court: US Supreme Court
2. Disposition: Reverse and remand.
3. Holding: The Van Dusen rle should apply even when the plaintiff makes a transfer motion under 1404(a).
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: The PA court dismissed the action under the statute of limitations. The 3rd circuit affirmed.
6. Facts: Ferens lived in PA and was injured. After the PA statute of limitations ran, Ferens sud in USDC in Misssissippi. Ferens moved to transfer the action to PA under 1404(a).
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: Application of the Van Dusen rule to transfers would not enhance the opportunities for forum shopping that plaintiffs already possessed and would support the Van Dusen policy of assuring that transfers were made when litigational convenience so dictated.

Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1939
Court: US Supreme Court
2. Disposition: Reverse and remand.
3. Holding: The state burden-of-proof rule involved related to a substantial right upon which the holder of recorded legal title to Texas land may confidently rely.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: 5th Circuit Court of Appeals held that Federal court in a diversity case was not bound by Erie to follow a state burden of proof rule in a suit to remove a cloud from a land title, but could instead follow the general equitable rule on burden of proof.
6. Facts:
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning:

Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1941
Court: US Supreme Court
2. Disposition: Reverse and remand
3. Holding:
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: USDC ND of Illinois ordered Sibbach to a physical examination to determine the extent of the injuries but Sibbach refused. Sibbach was imprisoned and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
6. Facts: Sibbach was involved in an automobile accident.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: The Court recognized substantive rules and procedural rules and implied that if a rule fit into one category it could not also fit within the other.

Palmer v. Hoffman
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1943
Court: US Supreme Court
2. Disposition: Reverse and remand
3. Holding: Rule 8(c) concerns only the manner of pleading, not the burden of proof. The burden of establishing contributory negligence is a question of local law which federal courts in diversity of citizenship cases must apply.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: The district court charged the jury that the burden of proof on the issue of contributory negligence was on the defendant, contrary to state law.
6. Facts:
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning:

Guaranty Trust Co. v. York
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1945
Court: US Supreme Court
2. Disposition: Reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
3. Holding: “outcome determination” test.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: The district court granted summary judgment for Guaranty. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that in a suit brought on the equity side of a federal court, the court was not obliged to apply the statute of limitations that would govern in the state courts of the same state.
6. Facts: York filed a class action against Guaranty in federal district court based on diversity jurisdiction. York alleged an equitable claim of breach of trust.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning:

Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1946
Court: US Supreme Court
2. Disposition:
3. Holding: Upheld the validity of Rule 4(f), stating that the substantive rights restriction was not aimed at such incidental effects as necessarily attend the adoption of the prescribed new rules of procedure upon the rights of litigants who have been brought before a court authorized to determine their rights.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History:
6. Facts: Murphree challenged the validity of Rule 4(f), which expanded the ability of the district court to serve process to the entire state, under the “substantive rights” restriction of the Rules Enabling Act.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning:

Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co.
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1949
Court: US Supreme Court
2. Disposition:
3. Holding: The Kansas statute had to be applied in a federal diversity action.
4. Issue: Conflict between Rule 3, which provides that an action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court, and a Kansas statute that required commencement by service of process.
5. Procedural History:
6. Facts:
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning:

Woods v. Interstate Realty Co.
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1949
Court: US Supreme Court
2. Disposition:
3. Holding:
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History:
6. Facts: A Mississippi statute closed the doors of the state’s courts to foreign corporations that failed to qualify under state law to do business within the state.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning:

Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1949
Court:
2. Disposition:
3. Holding: Rule 23 did into address security for expenses and was not in conflict with the state law.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History:
6. Facts:
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning:

Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1956
Court:
2. Disposition:
3. Holding: Under the outcome determinative test, outcome might be substantially changed if the clause would be held invalid and arbitration disallowed y a state court but ordered by a federal court in a diversity action.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History:
6. Facts:
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning:

Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc.
1. Case Heading:
Parties: (lineman in the construction crew) and (the employer)
Year: 1958
Court:
2. Disposition: Reverse the judgment of the Appeals Court and remand.
3. Holding:
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: The jury awarded Byrd. The 4th Circuit reversed and ruled for Blue.
6. Facts: Byrd was injured while connecting power lines. Byrd commenced a diversity action in FDC in SC against Blue for negligence.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: Blue argued that Byrd was a statutory employee and was barred from suing Blue because statutory compensation benefits were the exclusive remedy.

Hanna v. Plumer
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1965
Court: US Supreme Court
2. Disposition: Reverse the judgment of the Appeals Court and remand.
3. Holding: Rule 4(d)(1) neither exceeded the congressional mandate nor transgressed constitutional bounds; it is the standard against which the District Court should have measured the adequacy of the service.
4. Issue: Whether, in a civil action where the jurisdiction of the USDC is based upon diversity, service of process shall be made in the manner prescribed by state law or that set forth in Rule 4(d)(1).
5. Procedural History: DC granted Plumer’s motion for summary judgment. The 1st Circuit concluded that the conflict was over a substantive rather than a procedural matter and affirmed.
6. Facts: An automobile accident occurred in South Carolina between Hanna, a citizen of Ohio, and Plumer, a citizen of Massachusetts. Service was made by leaving copies of the summons and the complaint with Plumer’s wife at his residence, in compliance with Rule 4(d)(1). Plumer’s executor responded that the action could not be maintained because it was contrary to and in violation of the provisions of Mass. General Laws.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning:

Walker v. Armco Steel Corp.
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1980
Court: US Supreme Court
2. Disposition: Affirmed.
3. Holding: Rule 3 did not conflict with the OK statute.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: The FDC of Oklahoma rejected an argument that Hanna had implicitly overruled Ragan. The 10th Circuit affirmed, finding that Rule 3 was in direct conflict with the OK statute of limitations and that Ragan was good law.
6. Facts:
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning:

Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Woods
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1987
Court: US Supreme Court
2. Disposition: Reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand.
3. Holding: The AL statute imposing mandatory affirmance penalty has no application in federal diversity actions.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: The jury trial awarded $300000 for Alan Woods and $5000 for Cara Woods. Burlington posted bond to stay the judgment pending appeal and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Woods moved for imposition of AL’s mandatory affirmance penalty of 10% amount of the judgment and Burlington challenged as violative of the equal protection and due process guarantees of the 14th amendment and as a procedural rule inapplicable in federal court.
6. Facts: Woods sought damages for a motorcycle accident. Burlington removed the case to a FDC under diversity jurisdiction.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning:

Stewart Organization v. Ricoh Corp
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1988
Court: US Supreme Court
2. Disposition:
3. Holding: Federal courts must apply a federal statute that controls the issue before the cout and that represents a valid exercise of Congress’ constitutional power.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History:
6. Facts:
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning:

Chambers v. NASCO, Inc.
1. Case Heading:
Parties: (seeks specific performance) and (sanctioned for bad conduct)
Year: 1991
Court: US Supreme Court
2. Disposition: Affirm.
3. Holding: Application of a federal rule of practice over conflicting state law does not violate Erie unless forum shopping or inequitable administration of the law results.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: The district court sanctioned NASCO under its inherent powers for the conduct that did not violate Rule 11. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
6. Facts: Chambers brought a diversity action to obtain specific performance of a contract and NASCO engaged in bad-faith conducts.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: NASCO argued that Erie required a federal court to look to state law to determine what conduct should be sanctioned in the absence of federal rule.

Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromati Communications Enterprises, Inc.
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1991
Court: US Supreme Court
2. Disposition:
3. Holding: The Rule 11’s requirement of reasonable inquiry applied to represented parties as well as attorneys. The Federal Rules are to be considered prima facie valid because of the participation by the Supreme Court, Congress, and the Advisory Committee.
4. Issue: Can Rule 11 be validly applied to sanction a represented party who had signed a litigation document in violation of the rule, but in good faith?
5. Procedural History:
6. Facts:
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: Argued that the parties violated the Enabling Act by (1) authorizing fee shifting in a manner not approved by Congress and (2) creating a federal tort of malicious prosecution that encroached on various state causes of action. The Court rejected both arguments.

Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc.
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1996
Court: US Supreme Court
2. Disposition: Vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
3. Holding:
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: A jury awarded $450000 to Gasperini. The Center moved for a new trial, arguing that the verdict was excessive. The district court denied the Center’s motion. The 2nd Circuit reversed and ordred a new trial unless Gasperini agree to $100000.
6. Facts: Gasperini lent 300 color transparencies to the Center for use in an educational videotape. The Center lost the transparencies. Gasperini sued in SDNY under diversity.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning:

Semtek International Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp.
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 2001
Court: US Supreme Court
2. Disposition: Reverse the MD Court of Special Appeals judgment.
3. Holding: Rule 41(b) is inapplicable to the case, the scope of federal diversity judgments is controlled by federal common law, but federal common law would normally adopt the res judicata law of the state where the federal diversity judgment was rendered.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: Lockheed removed to a CA federal district court. Lockheed moved to dismiss based on the statute of limitations. The court ordered the dismissal. The 9th circuit affirmed. Lockheed moved to dismiss the MD action based on res judicata. The MD Court of Special Appeals affirmed and dismissed the suit based on res judicata, stating that the federal law controlled the scope of the federal judgment.
6. Facts: Semtek alleged a breach of contract and various business torts. Semtek sued in CA state court. Semtek also sued Lockheed in MD state court.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning:

Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate Insurance Co.
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 2010
Court: US Supreme Court
2. Disposition: Reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand.
3. Holding:
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: The District Court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, reasoning based on NY Civ Prac Law Ann despite Rule 23, and concluded that the statutory interest is a penalty and 901(b) prohibited the proposed class action. The 2nd Circuit affirmed.
6. Facts: Shady provided medical care to Sonia Galvez for injuries she suffered in an automobile accident. As partial payment, Galvez assigned her rights to insurance benefits to Shady. Shady tendered a claim for the assigned benefits to Allstate, which had 30 days to pay the claim or deny it under NY law. Allstate paid, but not on time, and refused to pay the statutory interest. Shady filed the diversity suit in the EDNY to recover the interest, on behalf of itself and a class of all others to whom Allstate owes interest.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning:

Anderson v. Hale
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 2001
Court: USDC ND of Illinois
2. Disposition: Deny Hale’s motion.
3. Holding: Anderson is entitled to discover state bar investigative files on Hale.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: The court determined that the file may hold some information that Anderson may use to prove his section 1985(3) claim. Hale filed a Rule 60(b) motion but Anderson obtained the entire investigative file and perused it. Anderson subpoenaed Iowa, Ohio, and Wyoming state bars.
6. Facts: Anderson subpoenaed the State Bar of Montana to obtain its investigative file on Hale. Montana created the file upon receiving Hale’s application for admission to the Montana bar. The file contained 2500 pages related to Hale’s character and fitness. Hale countered that the information was not remotely relevant to the lawsuit, not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and was made in bad faith to interfere with securing a law license.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning:

Behler v. Hanlon
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 2001
Court: USDC D of Maryland
2. Disposition: Deny the discovery of the information.
3. Holding:
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History:
6. Facts: Behler sought to obtain discovery of facts relating to income earned and work done by Keehn on behalf of insurance companies and defense attorneys in connection with conducting Rule 35 examinations of Behler in personal injury cases. Counsel for Hanlon objected to the discovery.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning:

W.E. Aubuchon Co. v. BeneFirst, LLC.
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 2007
Court: USDC D of Mass.
2. Disposition: Affirm.
3. Holding: BeneFirst should produce the information.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: The Court ruled that BeneFirst was to provide the files and bills.
6. Facts: Aubuchon employs, sponsors, and administers Employee Medical Benefit Plan; sponsors Aubuchon Distribution; employs and administers Aubuchon Co. and Distribution EMBP. Benefirst entered into a contract to assume the rights, duties, and obligations to administer the ERISA plans. Aubuchon charge that BeneFirst failed to perform its duties in a reasonably prudent manner. Aubuchon sought to compel Benefirst to produce all medical claims files, including the actual medical ills in BeneFirst’s custody or control.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning:

Upjohn Co. v. U.S.
1. Case Heading:
Parties: (target of an audit for foreign payment) and (requests records)
Year: 1981
Court: US Supreme Court
2. Disposition: Reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand.
3. Holding:
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: The USDC for the WD of Mich. concluded that the summons should be enforced. The 6th circuit rejected the waiver of the attorney-client privilege and remanded.
6. Facts: Upjohn sells pharmaceuticals. An audit discovered that Upjohn’s foreign subsidiaries paid to or for the benefit of foreign government officials to secure government business. The accountants informed Thomas at Upjohn and he decided to conduct an internal investigation of the questionable payments. The attorneys prepared a letter to “all foreign general and area managers” about the payments and requested full information about such payments. Upjohn voluntarily submitted a preliminary report to the SEC about the payments and a copy sent to the IRS, which began an investigation. The Service issued a summons demanding from Upjohn, and Upjohn declined to produce the second paragraph documents based on the attorney-client privilege. The US filed a petition seeking enforcement of the summons.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning:

Hickman v. Taylor
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1947
Court: US Supreme Court
2. Disposition: Affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals.
3. Holding:
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: The DC for the ED of PA held that the matters were not privileged and decreed that the tug owners and Fortenbaugh answer. Upon their refusal, the court adjudged them in contempt and ordered imprisonment. The 3rd Circuit reversed and found the matters privileged.
6. Facts: The tug “J.M. Taylor” sank while towing a car float of the Railroad. Five of the nine crew members drowned. The tug owners employed a law firm to defend against potential suits by representatives of the deceased and to sue the railroad for damages to the tug. A public hearing before the US Steamboat Inspectors examined the four survivors and Fortenbaugh from the law firm privately interviewed the survivors. Fortenbaugh also interviewed others related to the accident. Claims were presented by representatives of the five deceased; four were settled without litigation and the fifth suit was brought in a federal court under the Jones Act against the two tug owners and the railroad. Petitioner filed 39 interrogatories toward the tug owners and the owners, through Fortenbaugh, answered all except No. 38 and the supplemental ones, claiming that the requests called for privileged matter.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning:

Alta Health Strategies, Inc. v. Kennedy
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1992
Court: USDC D of Utah
2. Disposition:
3. Holding: Grant Alta’s motion to compel discovery of interrogatories No. 18-20.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History:
6. Facts: Alta moves to compel discovery on the grounds that Kennedy refuse to respond to interrogatories No. 18 to 20. Kennedy argues that the interrogatories No. 18 to 20 seek undiscoverable attorney work product.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning:

Bank Brussels Lambert v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1997
Court: USDC SD of NY
2. Disposition: BPS’s motion is granted and Andersen’s cross-motion is denied.
3. Holding:
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History:
6. Facts: Bank Group entered into a revolving credit agreement to fund AroChem. The Bank Group discovered financial discrepancies in the inventories of AroChem. AroChem formed Special Committee to investigate and retained Andersen to conduct a financial investigation. The Bank Group sued AroChem and included Bank Paribas S.A. BPS sought to take depositions of Andersen and a subpoena was issued. Over objection, BPS filed a motion to compel depositions of Andersen. Chase joins Andersen’s opposition and cross-motion.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: Andersen claims that it is shielded from discovery by Rule 26(b)(4)(D) and that the Rule applies here. Andersen is an expert. Andersen was hired in anticipation of litigation. BPS met the burden of showing exceptional circumstances on obtaining facts or opinions.

Pretzel & Stouffer v. Imperial Adjusters, Inc.
1. Case Heading:
Parties: (seeks unpaid legal fee) and (failed to file or attend the hearing)
Year: 1994
Court: 7th Circuit
2. Disposition: Affirm the judgment.
3. Holding:
4. Issue: Did the trial court err when (1) it denied Imperial’s motion to vacate the default and (2) subsequently entered default judgment against Imperial?
5. Procedural History: Imperial filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Pretzel filed a motion for leave to file a First Amended Complaint. Imperial did not file an answer by March 5 as ordered by the district court nor did it attend the status hearing on March 24. The district court entered an order of default against Imperial. Imperial filed a motion requesting that the default be vacated, submitted for filing an answer to the Amended Complaint, but failed to request leave of court or serve a copy upon Pretzel. The court denied Imperial’s motion to vacate the default and ordered default judgment against Imperial.
6. Facts: Pretzel alleged that Imperial owed Pretzel $132000 in unpaid legal fees. Imperial filed his appearance and answered to Pretzel’s complaint.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning:

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1986
Court: US Supreme Court
2. Disposition: Reverse the judgment of the DC Circuit.
3. Holding:
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: The USDC for the DC granted Celotex’s motion for summary judgment. Court of Appeals of the DC Circuit reversed.
6. Facts: Catrett, wife of decent, filed a lawsuit alleging that the death resulted from his exposure to products containing asbestos manufactured or distributed by 15 corporations. Catrett was unable to produce evidence in support of allegation in wrongful-death complaint that the decedent was exposed to Celotex’s asbestos products.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning:

Lake at Las Vegas Investors Group, Inc. v. Pacific Malibu Development Corp.
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1991
Court: 9th Circuit
2. Disposition: Affirm the judgment.
3. Holding:
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: The district court granted Transcontinental’s motion to dismiss and denied Lake’s motion for oral argument or reconsideration.
6. Facts: Lake filed a suit alleging that Pacific interfered with and induced the breach of an agreement. Lake filed a notice of voluntary dismissal and refilled immediately thereafter. Pacific removed to federal court based on diversity. Lake filed a voluntary dismissal against Transcontinental, amended complaint against Pacific, and moved for leave to add Transcontinental and others.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning:

Costello v. U.S.
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1961
Court: US Supreme Court
2. Disposition: Affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
3. Holding: The government was not barred from instituting the present proceeding.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: The US denaturalization complaint was dismissed no the ground that wiretapping may have infected both the Government’s affidavit of good cause and its evidence. The Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit reversed on the ground that the government should have been afforded an opportunity to show evidence.
6. Facts: The DC for the SDNY revoked Costello’s citizenship under the Immigration and Nationality Act.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: Costello argues that the proceeding was barred under Rule 41(b) by the failure of the district court on remand to specify that the dismissal was without prejudice to the filing of a new complaint. The Court disagrees.

Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1959
Court: US Supreme Court
2. Disposition: Reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
3. Holding:
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: The district court ordered the issues be tried to the court before jury determination. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
6. Facts: Fox seeks declaratory relief against Beacon alleging a controversy arising under the Sherman Antitrust Act and under the Clayton Act. Fox operates a movie theater. The contracts grant it the exclusive right to show first run pictures. Beacon built a drive-in theater and considered contracts in violation of the antitrust laws. Fox’s complaint alleges duress and coercion from Beacon. Unless Beacon was restrained, irreparable harm would result. Fox prayed for a declaration that a grant of clearance between the two is reasonable and for an injunction to prevent Beacon from instituting an action. Beacon answered and crossclaimed, claiming that the theatres were not in competition, the clearances were unreasonable, and alleged a conspiracy by Fox. Beacon demanded a jury trial.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning:

Burns v. Lawther
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1995
Court: 11th Circuit
2. Disposition: Vacate and remand.
3. Holding: The plain text of Rule 7(a) defines what constitutes a pleading for purposes of Rule 38. The appellees’ answer is the last responsive pleading and treat jury demand as timely filed.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: Burns sued alleging the 8th Amendment violation. Lawther responded. Burns amended the complaint by adding the FTCA claim and demanding jury trial. The magistrate recommended that the action proceed to trial and the defendants responded. The case was set for a non-jury trial over Burns’ objection. The district court ruled for defendants on all claims.
6. Facts: Burns, a federal prisoner, suffered from fistula where an organ’s swelling interferes with the operation of another organ. The fistula required surgery and caused Burns pain. Burns alleges that the PAs Lawther and Torres were deliberately indifferent to his known medical needs against the 8th Amendment. Burns also brought an FTCA claim against the US.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning:

Bell v. Vanlandingham
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1994
Court: Supreme Court of Alabama
2. Disposition: Reverse and remand.
3. Holding: The trial court erred in not striking Juror Kornegay for cause.
4. Issue: Did the trial court abuse its discretion by refusing to dismiss for cause the three jurors?
5. Procedural History: The jury returned a verdict for Vanlandingham. Bell moved for a new trial on the ground that the trial judge erred by declining Bell’s request to strike three jurors for cause.
6. Facts: Bell brought a medical malpractice action against Vanlandingham.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning:

Selgas v. American Airlines, Inc.
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1994
Court: USDC District of Puerto Rico
3. Holding: Deny American’s motion for judgment as a matter of law. Limit or eliminate the damages to $1.5mil.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: The jury awarded Selgas $1mil in compensatory damages and $2.37mil total.
6. Facts: Selgas was working at American for 18 years when she was terminated.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning:

Walker v. K
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1994
Court: Supreme Court of Arkansas
2. Disposition: Dismiss the appeal.
3. Holding: Gary L. Walker is the prevailing party and cannot appeal and he has no standing to appeal for Gary D. Walker.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: The trial court granted Walker’s motion for summary judgment and K’s motion to amend his complaint to name Gary D. Walker as the defendant and allow it to relate back.
6. Facts: K stopped his truck due to traffic and was hit from behind by a car. Walker, driving the third vehicle, hit the second car. Kazi filed suit and caused smmons to be served on Walker. Walker denied in his answer.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning:

Powder Basin Psychiatric Associates, Inc. v. Ullrich
1. Case Heading:
Parties: (employer) and (employees)
Year: 1996
Court: Court of Appeals of Idaho
2. Disposition: Affirm the district court’s judgment.
3. Holding:
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: The district court granted a partial summary judgment for Ullrich and upheld its ruling on a motion to reconsider.
6. Facts: Powder and Ullrich terminated employment agreement after seven months. Powder sued Ullrich, alleging that Ullrich took some office furniture and equipment to furnish his new office. Ullrich responded that he was entitled to certain financial offsets. Powder claimed that Ullrich possessed more property than alleged in the complaint. Powder did not amend to seek an accounting or to recover, but settled. Powder drafted a stipulation to dismiss and was granted. Powder filed a second action, alleging that Ullrich wrongfully retained monies for services during his employment. Ullrich responded that the action was barred by res judicata and invoked unjust enrichment.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning:

Thibeault v. Brackett
1. Case Heading:
Parties: (contributed to the home expansion) and (owner of the home)
Year: 2007
Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
2. Disposition: Affirm the judgment.
3. Holding: The two matters, for personal property and the contributions, do not involve the same cause of action.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: Thibeault recovered her personal property in small claims action. Thibeault sued in Superior Court, alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment. Brackett moved to dismiss, arguing that the small claims bars the action under the res judicata. The court denied the motion. At a jury trial, the court found for Brackett on the breach of contract claim and for Thibeault on the unjust enrichment claim.
6. Facts: Thibeault and Brackett, in a relationship in NH, moved to Temple, a property purchased by Brackett. They separated six years later. Both upt money and efforts into converting the hunting shck into 3-4 bedroom home.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning:

United-Bilt Homes, Inc. v. Sampson
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1993
Court: Supreme Court of Arkansas
2. Disposition: Reverse the judgment of the chancery court and remand.
3. Holding: The transaction at issue in Sampson I was the disbursement of insurance roceeds for a repair contract. The subsequent default is a separate transaction or occurrence.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: The chancery court found that the action for foreclosure was a 13(a) claim and dismissed the claim.
6. Facts: In Sampson I, Court affirmed Sampson’s judgments against United because United, on Sampson’s homeowner’s policy, wrongly refused to release insurance proceeds following a fire. United filed a complaint for foreclosure and Sampson answered and filed a motion to dismiss claiming the foreclosure action was a compulsory counterclaim in Sampson I.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: United argues that the foreclosure action did not arise out of the transaction or occurrence litigate and that its cause of action did not mature until after the issues were joined.

Cycles, Ltd. v. Navistar Financial Corp.
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1994
Court: 5th Circuit
2. Disposition: Vacate and remand.
3. Holding: The Ark judgment had no preclusive effect upon decisions already reached after full litigation. The district court’s original decision was final for purposes of issue preclusion.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History:
6. Facts: Cycles leased truck trailers to Digby. Digby refused to return the trailers and Cycles sued Digby for conversion. SD of Mis ruled that Digby should return the trailers to Cycles. Cycles sued Navistar in the SD of Mis, claiming that Navistar also converted the trailers when Navistar transferred the certificates of title to Digby in exchange for full payment. The district court agreed that Navistar converted and awarded Cycles. Navistar filed post-judgment motions to amend the findings of fact and conclusions of law to alter or amend the judgment. Digby I was vacated for lack of jurisdiction. Cycles filed Digby II in federal district court for the ED of Ark. Ark Court ruled for Digby. The SD of Mis revised and entered judgment for Navistar based on the principles of res judicata and collateral estoppels.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning:

Holtman v. 4-G’s Plumbing & Heating, Inc.
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1994
Court: Supreme Court of Montana
2. Disposition: Reverse the judgment of the district court and remand.
3. Holding: Identical issue element of collateral estoppels is not met and the district court erred in concluding that Holtman is collaterally stopped.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: The court dismissed the counterclaim with prejudice because it was not timely filed and Holtman failed to obtain leave of court. The Court affirmed the dismissal. Holtman filed the action against the Association and 4-G. Defendants moved for summary judgment based on res judicata and collateral estoppels. The District Court dismissed the claims.
6. Facts: Holtman owned a condominium. Association authorized an employee of 4-G to enter Holtman’s condominium to repair a leak and install a new heating system. Holtman discovered a partially installed heating system and alleged asbestos contamination. Holtman refused to allow further work. The Association filed a complaint to require the installation. Holtman responded by generally denying and, two years later, filed a counterclaim without leave of court.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning:

Hebden v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board
1. Case Heading:
Parties: (coal miner for over thirty years) and (awarded disability)
Year: 1993
Court: Supreme Court of PA
2. Disposition: Reverse the judgment of the Commonwealth Court.
3. Holding: Unable to show the disease’s reversibility, the employer is preclude from trying to show that the disease has been reversed.
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History:
6. Facts: Hebden was awarded workmen’s compensation partial disability benefits for an occupationally acquired pulmonary lung disease. Bethenergy Mines filed a petition for modification alleging that Hebden’s disability had changed and that he was no longer disabled. Bethenergy’s witnesses testified that Hebden was fit to return to work while Hedben’s witness testified otherwise. The referee resolved in favor of Bethenergy and the Workmen’s Compensatin Appeal Board and the Commonwealth Court affirmed.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning:

Malloy v. Trombley
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1980
Court: Court of Appeals of New York
2. Disposition: Affirm.
3. Holding:
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: Malloy and Trombley sued each other in Supreme Court and both filed against the Sate. The State claims were dismissed. Trombley served a supplemental answer and moved for summary judgment on the ground that the finding of contributory negligence on the part of Malloy barred recovery by him. Supreme Court denied the motion but the Appellate Court reversed and granted the motion.
6. Facts: Trombley stopped at an unlighted rural highway, turned off the light, and talked with a passenger. Trooper Britt stopped his patrol car opposite the Trombley car and questioned Trombley. Malloy’s car approached and Britt shouted Trombley car passengers to get down and ran for cover behind his car. The Malloy vehicle struck the rear of the Trombley car and both car occupants were injured.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning:

Hunter v. City of Des Moines
1. Case Heading:
Parties:
Year: 1981
Court: Supreme Court of Iowa
2. Disposition: Affirm.
3. Holding:
4. Issue:
5. Procedural History: Hunter amended stating that the Wadle action precluded the city from relitigating. Trial court denied the application and the jury returned a verdict in favor of the city.
6. Facts: Hunter was involved in a collision with another vehicle. Hunter and the passenger Wadle sued the other vehicle driver and the City of Des Moines for failure to remove a snow pile that obstructed the view. The City filed a motion to consolidate the actions but was overruled. The appeal was denied and the two actions proceeded separately.
7. Rule:
8. Reasoning: